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Abstract 
The DoD has recognized the need for persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) over the last two decades. Recent developments with commercial drones 
have changed the market structure; there is now a thriving and extensive market base for drone 
based remote sensing. This research provides system engineering methods to support the DoD 
use of this burgeoning market to meet operational ISR needs. The three contributions of this 
research are: a process to support Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) design, tools to 
support the design process, and tools to support risk assessment and reduction for both design 
and operations. The process and tools are presented via an exemplar design for an ISR SUAS 
mission. The exemplar design flows from user needs through to an allocated baseline with an 
assessment of system reliability based on a compilation of commercial component reliability and 
failure modes.  
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PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
I.  Introduction 
 Demand is increasing for operational and tactical information superiority in the deployed 
environment. Due to the diversity of enemy tactics, varying terrain, and users, each mission type 
may require specific system requirements to meet performance objectives. Small Unmanned 
Aerial Systems (SUAS) are excellent tools to provide deployed operators increased situational 
awareness on the battlefield. Tactical deployed operators desire low transport size and weight, 
rapid customization, and low system complexity, SUASs meet this need.  
An opportunity exists within the commercial drone industry due to rapid technical 
advancement from increased competition and lower technical entry barriers. This market can be 
leveraged to design simple SUASs that meet mission requirements with low development time 
and financial commitment. The following thesis will use current system engineering tools and 
methods to establish a SUAS product design process that meets mission requirements and 
mitigates system risks.  
  DoD program offices currently contract out design and platform support for SUAS. This 
current structure limits the programs office’s ability to own the technical baseline. Where the 
owning this baseline involves understanding how the SUAS performs and is operated; 
facilitating shifts in the design to new or emergent mission sets. With ownership, the program 
office can respond in a timely manner to operator needs, reducing product time to the field.  A 
detailed knowledge of the system also enables the program office to understand technology 
trends to map to future capability gaps of the warfighter. This research presents a process to 
enable DoD program offices to align tactical and operational customers’ demands with a reliable 
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SUASs. We assess that this process will have multiple benefits, alleviating UAS budgetary 
pressure and contractor limitation of the SUAS design model.  
Cost is a Mitigated Factor for Military SUAS 
Within a military context, funds are projected through a five-year view titled the Future 
Years Defense Program (FYDP).  Figure 1 projects the approximate spending through the FYDP 
for group four and five drones, the data indicates an in increase procurement and operation and 
maintenance cost over that time (Morris, 2018). Group four and five drones weigh greater than 
1320 lbs and are predominately made up of the Air Force’s RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper, 
MQ-1 Predator, the Army’s MQ-1 Grey Eagle and MQ-5 Hunter (Dempsey, 2010).  
Global Hawks cost $140 to $211 million per system and the other systems are in the $5-
30 million range. Beyond unit cost, one can see in Figure 1 that maintenance costs are projected 
to grow through 2021 due to the increasing number of deployed drones and increased 
capabilities. To underline the growth in cost and capability, a new Reaper squadron costs $160 
million annually, in contrast to $70 million for a legacy Predator squadron.  
 
Figure 1. Future Years Defense Program for Department of Defense UAS (Morris, 2018).   
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The growth in cost, both procurement and maintenance are constrained by available 
budget. How does the DoD fulfill its need for persistent ISR within fiscal constraints? One path 
to reduce UAS costs is to field more capable large group UAS, while decreasing overall 
inventory and maintenance cost. Another path is fielding smaller, mission specific UAS 
controlled by soldiers on the ground (Morris, 2018). Implementation of smaller UAS would 
include mass customized systems with short life spans, focusing on reducing maintenance cost in 
favor of platform flexibility to new or evolving mission sets.  
Separate from the growing demand for persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) in the DoD, other technological advances have spurned a rapidly 
expanding and active commercial market. The Commercial drone sector supports aerial 
photography, shipping, disaster management, search and rescue, geological mapping, building 
safety, crop monitoring, unmanned cargo transport, law enforcement and border control, and 
storm tracking. “Projections to 2025 show commercial drones could be an $82 billion industry 
with a 100,000 job boost to the U.S. economy” (Jenkins and Vasigh, 2013). As demand increases 
for drone functionality and technology, investments will increase from industrial conglomerates, 
electronic parts companies, and information technology firms, this increased activity in turn 
lowers prices and increases available functionality (D. Joshi, 2017). There are overlaps between 
DoD and commercial needs. This overlap poses an opportunity whereby the DoD can benefit 
from the commercial sectors investments. The DoD can exploit the diverse functionality 
provided by the market to meet its needs at a lower cost.  
Figure 2 displays the cost in millions of dollars in comparison to the payload weight in 
pounds for the five DoD defined UAS groups. Group one, Mini UAS, is 3 orders of magnitude of 
cost smaller than a group five, High Altitude Long Endurance UAS, or 2.5 orders of magnitude 
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smaller than a group four, Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAS. For every group five UAS, 
1,250 group one UAS can be bought or 163 for every group four UAS. While individually less 
capabile, the individual cost, risks, and barriers of smaller UAS pose an opportunity. SUAS 
provide disaggregated risk (lose of one SUAS versus one HALE), lower cost and possibility of 
mass customoziation for user need (Joseph Pine, 1992). 
 
Figure 2. UAV Cost and Payload Capacity Ranges for DoD UAV Groups (Fladeland, 
Schoenung, & Lord, 2017) 
 
Commercial drones are a further price point reduction from contracted military drones. 
“Purchase prices for small drones are currently on the order of, for hobbyist devices, $100 to 
$1,000, and for low-end professional use $5,000 to $10,000. For some applications, the 
indicative costs per hour of flight are currently on the order of $25 for small drones compared 
with $750 for manned fixed-wing aircraft and $1,350 for manned rotorcraft. For applications for 
which the limitations are acceptable, such as the gathering of moderate-quality image and video, 
small drones are now vastly more economic than aircraft, and much more economic than large 
drones. This is naturally giving rise to both substitution effects and new customers.” (Clarke, 
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2014) For comparison a military group 1 UAS, RQ-11B Raven, costs $250,000 for the complete 
system including the air vehicle, ground station, and support equipment (Army Technology, 
2018).  
Problem Statement 
Currently the design of SUAS systems is left to functional experts or DoD contractors 
due to perceived system complexity. This research asserts that the ease and maturity of the 
commercial drone market has reduced entry barriers allowing for a broader base of system 
designer. The DoD can leverage these newly available technologies to design SUASs for military 
utility. A specific methodology does not exist for engineers or program managers with technical 
backgrounds to design a SUAS, using commercial parts, for a given reference mission.  
Scope and Assumptions  
 The analysis has been restricted to Group 1 UAS. All vehicle weights must be under 20 
lbs (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). Group 1 UAS size fits within the parameters of 
commercially available components for drones, which is the focus of this research. Group 1 UAS 
size also fits the transportation requirements of the selected Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) exemplar of this research. 
Time constraints only permitted one reference system to be demonstrated. The reference 
system aligns with current capabilities of SUAS and are focused at a duration between 30-60 
minutes for an ISR payload capability. Requirements from this mission set have been established 
and will be the basis for the component and system performance criteria within the research.  
Commercial components that are available to the public are the focus of the analysis, 
since the commercial drone market has matured to a point in which the DoD can leverage it for 
military utility. Commercial components were required to be available and accessible from 
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online drone manufactures or hobbyist sites in order to be analyzed in this thesis. DoD 
Contractors such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman and their SUAS 
components were outside the scope of this research. The performance for these components has 
been previously documented and demonstrated via DoD programs of record.  
The reference SUAS is an initial concept only and does not consider ruggedizing, 
weatherproofing, or cyber security integration. The research is focused on developing a concept 
development process for SUASs and is not focused on production level system maturity. Follow-
on research is required to develop and validate testable measures for the reference SUAS 
performance for defined operational conditions.  
The reference SUAS design space considers only multirotor platforms using a battery 
power system. This limitation enables the design space for the reference SUAS to be 
manageable, yet thorough, and within the constraints of thesis research. A multirotor platform 
was chosen due to the authors experience and familiarity with such platforms through the Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) SUAS design sequence.  Battery power sources were only 
considered due to the popularity within the commercial drone market.  
Investigative Questions 
1. What systems engineering methods are appropriate for a tailored rapid SUAS design 
process? 
2. What baseline design tools and heuristics are required to support decisions for vehicle 
performance, trades, reliability, assessment and follow-on designs?  
3. What SUAS components are critical to mission success and can reliability rates be found, 
documented, and analyzed for these components?  
Materials and Equipment  
 Cameo Systems Modeler SysML modeling tool by No Magic 
o Use Case Diagrams 
o Functional Architecture 
o Physical Architecture  
 Free Fault Tree Analysis Software, Fault Tree Analyser (ALD, 2018) 
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 Microsoft Excel documenting  
o Fault Tree Tables 
o Requirements 
o Operator Checklists 
o Design Trade Space/Checklist 
o Reliability Analysis  
 
Other Support 
 UAS manufacturers of critical parts often have reputation among hobbyists and 
enthusiasts. These individuals possess a level of knowledge on the operational performance of 
critical components that must be captured in order to completely assess the reliability. The Air 
Force Institute of Technology possesses the Autonomy, Navigation, and Timing (ANT) lab 
which tests SUAS in various configuration. Interviews will be conducted with ANT lab design 
experts on critical components to establish which manufactures of parts they prefer (of high 
quality and reliability) and which manufactures they do not prefer (of low quality and reliability).  
These staff members have decades of experience with remote controlled aircraft as well as the 
recent growing SUAS market. Interviews will provide input into the component selection 
process for the ISR mission design exemplar.  
 In addition to interviewing the ANT Lab staff, the greater drone and hobbyist community 
provides a wealth of knowledge on drone designs, reliable components, and measured 
performance. Various hobby websites are used to gather these inputs and to make informed 
engineering decisions. Appendix B provides a list of online drone sources used throughout 
section IV, including the focus of the website.  
Overview 
 Chapter II focuses on pertinent literature supporting system design for a small UAS.  The 
review includes an investigation into previous system designs for SUAS and any documented 
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methodologies. In Chapter III, the general System Engineering Process is defined and applied to 
a specific SUAS Product Development Process. This process is then used in Chapter IV for an 
Information Superiority SUAS mission set, and outputs a reference SUAS. Finally, Chapter V 
documents the benefits of the SUAS Product Development Process and key products produced 
for the program office.  
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II. Literature Review  
Chapter Overview 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate literature on system engineering techniques, and 
trades in order to inform the creation of a tailored product development process for Small 
Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS). This review also provides a background on SUAS and the 
associated military applications. This background informs our tailored systems engineering 
process, which will be outlined in Chapter III and demonstrated in Chapter IV. This thesis 
provides a system design methodology for SUAS based on established military operational 
reference missions. Trades will be performed on air vehicle designs, critical component types, 
materials, integration, and redundancy in order to determine the highest system reliability that 
still meets the operational reference mission requirements.  
SUAS Technology Overview 
 A SUAS is defined as a controllable air vehicle providing increased functionality to the 
operator on the ground. Domestically, civil use of SUAS is limited to aircraft weighing less than 
55 lbs in, operating below 400 ft above ground level at speeds below 100 mph (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2016). Control of the air vehicle is established through a ground control station 
(GCS), which receives flight inputs from the operator and sends instructions via radio transmitter 
to the onboard flight computer. Control can be passed in two modes. The first is through a GCS 
software module enabling input for Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates and flight 
paths. The software can be run on a laptop, tablet, or phone. This control mode can be performed 
semi-autonomous where the user is actively sending command to the air vehicle through the 
GCS, or autonomous where the flight program is loaded on the ground and the air vehicle 
performs the mission without airborne commands from the GCS. The second mode is through a 
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Radio Controller enabling the operator to control the vehicle directly. In this mode the operator 
usually has a form of visual feedback for their control inputs, the most common type is first 
person point of view goggles (FPV). The flight computer or autopilot sends commands signals to 
the air vehicle’s motors, servos, and sensors. Furthermore, the computer keeps track of telemetry 
data including altitude, air speed, direction, battery voltage, and GPS coordinates; this 
information is routed back to the GCS software providing situational awareness for the operator. 
The different control modes can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Flight Control Modes 
 
Batteries are the common fuel choice for SUASs, enabling powered flight and sensor 
functionality. Power is routed to the flight computer and motors. Electronic speed controllers 
(ESCs) regulate the power output and control signals from the flight computer to the motors.  
The number of motors is dependent on the architecture of the air vehicle. For example, 
quadrotors have four motors, hexrotors have six, and octorotors eight. Motors are rated in KVs 
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defined as revolutions per minute per volt applied or RPM/Volt. Higher KV motors spin faster 
and pair with smaller propellers, while lower KV motors spin slower and pair with larger 
propellers (“How to Build a Drone - A Definitive Guide For Newbies,” 2018). Power available is 
ultimately a function of the number of propellers and motors, their RPM, and torque. Propellers 
on SUAS spin in opposite directions to their neighbors in order to balance torque effects in air. 
Simpler SUAS design usually have an even set of motors to attain this balance. Further changes 
in balance are leveraged to attain yaw, pitch, and roll or general aerial control.  
Battery elimination circuits (BECs) are similar to ESCs, but regulate voltage from the 
battery and enable a step down of 5V or 12V for critical electronics (Alex, 2015). Sensors enable 
increased situational awareness, which is the main functionality of the drone. Sensors are 
mounted on the SUAS’s frame or on a gimbal. A gimbal allows movement for the sensor in one 
or multiple axes with operator input through the GCS. Figure 4 provides a visual description of 
the SUAS system.  
 
Figure 4. Electrical and Component Layout of a Typical Drone(“Pixhawk Autopilot,” 2015) 
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Mission Need  
Demand for information superiority is constantly on the rise in the deployed 
environment. Increasing budget pressure due to the 2011 Budget Control Act and reliance on 
unmanned technology and capabilities have forced the Department of Defense (DoD) into one of 
two paths to cut costs. The first path involves reducing the number of large Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS), while focusing on increased functionality of the individual systems. The second 
path is fielding smaller, less capable UAS controlled by soldiers on the ground (Morris, 2018).  
SUAS components have decreased in cost due to reduced FAA drone restrictions. By 
reducing restrictions, the drone industry is more accessible to the public and industry, promoting 
a rise in functionality and application of drones in the civil sector. Higher demand has resulted in 
increased supply of drones and their components, which has led to reduced cost. The rise of the 
hobbyist industry has diffused information of drones, components, building, and configuration to 
the public through online blogs and forums. This diffusion has reduced complexity and entry 
barriers to the drone community. The DoD can leverage this industrial movement to procure, 
build, test, and push the functional boundaries of SUAS, while mitigating cost, airworthiness 
risks, and reliability risks.  
Currently, a system design methodology is lacking for the military in building and 
mapping SUASs to a given operational or design reference mission with quantitative 
requirements. This thesis will focus on establishing a reference missions within the scope of 
current SUAS capabilities, then utilizing model-based systems engineering processes to build a 
representative system. The objective of the design process is to build the a reliable SUAS system 
through systems and component level trades while meeting the reference mission requirements. 
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The goal of the thesis is to provide a simplified process allowing the DoD to own the technical 
baseline of the SUASs. 
Scope 
 This work is bounded by the following constraints. They have been chosen to allow for a 
less ill-structured problem; a space amenable to a defined design process. The process is 
demonstrated and validated with a specific design reference mission.  
 Total air vehicle weight is below 20 lbs  
 Only electrical power systems will be analyzed with a focus on current accepted and 
proven battery composition of lithium polymer batteries 
 Air vehicle frame types will include multirotor types only 
 Commercially and widely available components, frames, and materials will be evaluated 
 System modeling will focus on the concept development phase of systems engineering  
 
SUAS Military Applications 
 A 2007 study performed by Office of the Secretary of Defense showed unmanned 
systems are better suited for mission which are either dull, dirty, and/or dangerous, opposed to 
manned systems. Dull missions involve long hours of low stimulus to the operator or warfighter. 
Examples include surveillance missions or regional coverage mission. If the UAS handles the 
information collection and detection for these missions, it is superior to manned systems where 
fatigue can set in creating mistakes. Dirty missions include conditions which pose longer term 
risks to manned air crews such as radiation or chemical measurements. UASs excel in this 
mission set with specific sensors which keep the operators out of harm’s way. Dangerous 
mission sets include conditions which pose an immediate risk to human operator; an example 
include neutralization of improvised explosive devices. Unmanned systems lower human cost if 
the mission is unsuccessful (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).  
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The United States Air Force SUAS Flight Plan: 2016-2036, outlines that SUAS 
technology and operational evolution should aim at bridging the gap between tactical and 
strategic mission sets. The document argues “historically tactical SUASs are now mature enough 
to augment or assume Air Force requirements with operational and strategic impact.” (U.S. Air 
Force, 2016) This evolution of SUASs utility requires correct integration of technology, mission 
development, and human-system integration.  
 Envisioned SUAS applications or vignettes for future operations for the Air Force are: 
Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD/DEAD), Strike Coordination and 
Reconnaissance (SCAR), Counter-UAS (C-UAS), Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS), “Perch and 
Stare”, Sensor Air Drop, Weather Sensing, Airborne Layered Network (ALN), Nuclear Weapons 
Enterprise Operations Support, and Information Superiority (U.S. Air Force, 2016). The SUAS 
applications and their descriptions are outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1. SUAS Military Future Military Applications 
Mission Description 
SEAD/DEAD 
Involves sending SUASs from a host vehicle to destroy, jam, or overwhelm 
the enemy’s air defense forces. Focus attributes include weapons capability, 
high speed, long range, and sensor detect payload. 
SCAR 
Provides valuable intelligence back to larger platforms, host or operators. 
Intelligence includes detect and attack targets, minimization of collateral 
damage, and battle damage assessments. Focus attributes include locating 
and verifying target, communication with other assets, passing updates.  
C-UAS 
Employs SUASs to jam, destroy, or deceive enemy drones which pose a 
threat. 
BLOS 
Enables SUAS to operate over the horizon with increased range. Technique 
envisioned include air vehicle relays on SUASs or other larger vehicles.  
"Perch and 
Stare" 
Focuses on having SUASs in a loiter mode with low power levels to collect, 
analyze, communicate, and monitor over long duration mission. Focus areas 
are battery technology, solar power, utilization of the enemy’s power grid, 
and cyber-surveillance technology.  
Sensor Air 
Drop 
Enables delivery of various sensor types via the air including communication, 
seismic, acoustic, magnetic, daylight and infrared imagers. This capability 
keeps military members off the front lines and away from potential enemy 
risks. An additional use is geolocation information for covert emplacements 
and gathering critical intelligence before the emplacements are destroyed or 
defeated.   
Weather 
Sensing 
Provides real time weather data on demand for mission planning. Employing 
more SUASs improves regional weather reports into the Area of Command 
(AOC) weather data base; operators can pull up accurate and timely weather 
data for their locations.  
Airborne 
Layered 
Network 
Enables multi-platforms, multi-sensor SUAS networks to support future 
concepts including swarming. Position, sensor data, and communication can 
be shared across multiple platforms allowing SUAS to focus on specific 
functionality within a network, increasing the swarm’s overall capability and 
resiliency. See Figure 5 for typical ALN configuration.  
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Enterprise 
Support  
Focuses on domestic protection of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
complexes with capabilities of enemy detection, enemy attack, and 
information gather for possible intruders.  
Information 
Superiority  
Critical decisions require rapid decision-making process. SUAS promote 
rapidly transmitted photos and video for command decisions on enemies, 
troop movement, and situational awareness.  
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Figure 5. Possible Airborne Layered Network Configuration (U.S. Air Force, 2016) 
 
Previous Systems Engineering Studies Applied to SUAS 
 While limited, SUAS research exists for military applications with some system design 
case studies available providing information. The first step in the design process is to define 
requirements and minimum performance criteria for the system, based on mission scenarios and 
profiles. Mission profiles should establish typical and maximum altitudes, cruise and maximum 
speed, loiter speed, climb rate, endurance, and operational radius. Common performance 
requirements include: reliability, maintainability, availability, mobility, transportability, 
deployability, sustainability, environmental and electromagnetic effects, survivability, 
vulnerability, safety, interchangeability, and upgradeability (Torun, 2002).  
Careful attention should be paid to prioritizing requirements for system level trades. The 
design team should investigate representative systems that can meet proposed requirements and 
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document strengths and weaknesses (Ozdemir et al., 2014).  With the establishment of 
representative systems, component trades can be performed based on available technology.  
When performing trades there must be discriminators to base trades around. 
Discriminators are based around either prioritized requirements or costs. With discriminator 
criteria established the air vehicle design process can ensue. This process is done in a bottom up 
approach by designing and evaluating subsystems first and then the complete system. 
Subsystems include propulsion, controls, structural, and payload. 
 A specific system engineering method is the systems architecting with ilities (SAI). This 
method is appropriate for the concept development phase of the systems engineering process. 
This process supports architecture development where “architecting is the process of structuring 
the components of a system, their interrelationship, and their evolution over time” (Dagli & 
Kilicay-Ergin, 2009). Sturdivant and Chong detail the steps of the SAI method in their 2017 
journal article; 
 Step 1 – Determine Value Proposition and Constraints: this involves identifying and 
prioritizing requirements in the context of the overall architecture. 
 Step 2 – Identify Potential Perturbations: What are the risks or modes which can interfere 
with delivery of value from the system?  
 Step 3 – Identify Initial Desired Ilities: Ilities are the longer term aspects and behavior of 
the system, the designer must rank and prioritize ilities including but not limited to 
reliability, maintainability, and availability.  
 Step 4 – Generate Initial Architecture Alternatives: generate alternatives and trades 
which promote requirements.  
 Step 5 – Generate Ility-Driving Options: generate alternatives and trades which promote 
desired ilities. 
  Step 6 – Evaluate Potential Alternatives: model alternatives with desired metrics (cost, 
attributes, and ilities). This analysis can occur through modeling and simulation or higher 
abstraction levels.  
 Step 7 – Analyze Architecture Alternatives: perform evaluation of tradeoffs which exists 
from step 6 and document impact to overall architecture.  
 Step 8 – Trade-off and Select “Best” Architecture with Ilities: utilize results from step 7 
to determine preferred architecture to move forward into design (Sturdivant & Chong, 
2017). 
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 An additional system engineering method utilized for reliability analysis is Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), which determines what can go wrong in the system with 
representative probabilities and consequences. FMEA focuses on the early design phase,  
“minimizing the probability of failure or the effect of failure” (Dermentzoudis, 2004). There are 
basic questions the designer needs to answer when performing FMEA 
1. How can each part of the system possibly fail? 
2. What are mechanisms might produce these modes of failure? 
3. What could the effects be if the failures occur? 
4. Is the failure in the safe or unsafe direction? 
5. How is the failure detected? 
6. What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for the 
failures?(Hoyland & Rausand, 1994) 
 
When performing FMEA it is important to know that failures are not weighted equally; some 
failures can create an unrecoverable event and others are recoverable. In the case of SUAS, if a 
motor fails on a hexacopter it is recoverable, due to motor redundancy, versus a quadrotor where 
the vehicle unrecoverable. It is also important to know the customers’ requirements for the 
system. For example, if the SUAS is for Special Forces personnel they may emphasize packing 
of the system into a backpack, as opposed to Security Forces personnel who may emphasize 
packing the system into a Humvee. In both cases, being unable to pack and transport the SUAS 
in the required area is deemed a required function. Each function in the system must have a 
purpose and objective. By identifying these in the design process, faults can be better 
understood. Focus must always be placed on a fault prevention orientation (Stamatis, 1995).  
 FMEA is an iterative process. The system should be diagramed to show physical 
components and functionality so the design team can understand component and subsystem 
interactions. Once diagrammed, the design team should evaluate and collect any data on the 
components of the system in order to evaluate and brainstorm for potential failure modes.  
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When the failure modes are determined they are prioritized based on severity. If then 
statements are useful at this phase of the analysis to determine consequences. Some 
operationalization of the consequence severity must be established to compare failures against 
each other; a 1-10 scale is often used. The probability of a failure for a part can be determined by 
using failure data of the part. If data is not available, the failure probability must be estimated; 
knowing causes of failure can produce a better estimate. Finally, a risk priority number (RPN) is 
assigned to each part or component of the system based on the parts severity of failure multiplied 
by the probability of failure. RPN can be summed for a total system RPN. Additionally, the 
RPNs can be listed from highest to smallest. In the concept development phase FMEA process 
can be performed cyclically to buy down the RPN level and identify critical component trades 
(Stamatis, 1995)(Dermentzoudis, 2004).  
UAS Reliability 
 Reliability is defined as “the capacity of a component or a system to perform its required 
function under stated operating conditions for a specified period of time.” (Ebeling, 2005)  In the 
case of SUASs, operating conditions are bounded by the defined requirements and environment 
over the mission duration. Reliability is measured and estimated through modeling of parameters 
including Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) or Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). MTTF is 
used to measure parts which are non-repairable while MTBF is used for reparable parts (Petritoli, 
Leccese, & Ciani, 2017). Evaluating reliability is often done by measuring the unreliability of the 
system or the likelihood of failure over a set time (Justin & Murtha, 2009).  
 Determining mission success for a SUAS revolves around the system’s ability to perform 
its critical functions and providing use to operator on the ground. Utility, in the case of an 
Information Superiority mission, is the ability for the operator to have increased situational 
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awareness beyond their current location. There are three critical functions which enable an 
increase of situational awareness. The first is flight; this enables the air vehicle to provide 
increased perspective to the operator. Then next is control; the operator can provide instructions 
to the air vehicle and the air vehicle responds to these commands. For purposes of this thesis, 
control is semi-autonomous where the system can perform functions on its own but at some point 
requires instructions from the operator to perform actions (Flenar, 2018).  The next category is 
surveillance; the capability provided is visual, audio, or environmental measurements and must 
be obtainable by the operator. The system must also be transported to the deployment location 
with a high level of confidence of functionality. Finally, the air vehicle and support equipment 
must have power in order to perform all required functions. 
 If any of these critical functions fail, then the system is not performing the required 
functions and is considered a system failure. Flenar presents a semi- autonomous use case 
diagram in his thesis shown in Figure 6. Use cases define the modes or phases the system 
operates or exists in within the environment. All the use cases can be related to a critical function 
or multiple critical functions. Perform Setup enables flight, control and payload activation. 
Launch and Ingress, Egress and Recover, and Loiter support flight and control, if designated 
navigation points are established. Perform Surveillance, Follow Target, and Deliver Payload 
support control and payload operation. Plan Mission supports control. The use cases provide 
further allocation of the critical functions, while aligning closer to the operation mission and 
requirements.  
21 
 
  
Figure 6. Semi- Autonomous Use Case Diagram (Flenar, 2018) 
 
Components contribute to reliability ratings of critical functions. These effects can be 
seen in Figure 7. As more parts are added, N, the overall system reliability decreases 
exponentially. This function is true for componentry in serial configuration, meaning if one 
component in the architecture fails the entire system fails. For SUAS serial configuration is a fair 
assumption since design emphasis is placed on light, low cost systems. When considering design 
trades the number of components become as important as the individual reliability of 
components (Ebeling, 2005). Component count can also have a large impact the systems 
sustainment, changeability, and modularity. If failures are isolated and attributed to easily 
replaceable components or modules, then reliability analysis becomes more manageable.  
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 Figure 7. Serial System Reliability as a Function of Component Reliability (Ebeling, 
2005) 
 
 Measures of Performance (MOPs) are required to measure system reliability of SUAS. 
MOPs are historical in nature, meaning an event must occur to achieve a data point. In order to 
capture and record historical data, a database must be available and used to record this 
information. At this point in time neither the DoD nor the U.S. Air Force maintains a 
consolidated database for SUAS performance.  
Dermentzoudis (2004) discusses measures for a system with limited data. He states the 
number of flight hours and the number of crashes are usually known for a given deployed air 
vehicle. With this information, the only MOPs available for reliability measures are crash rate, 
current crash rate, and crash rate “X”. Crash rate is the current number of crashes divided by the 
total number of flight hours. Current crash rate is the same measure except for recording from 
the last know system modification. This measure is useful as a comparison data point to ensure 
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the system modification is increasing reliability. Finally, crash rate “X” is the number of crashes 
per a set number of hours enabling a view of trends including: weather impacts, supply chain 
disruptions, part burn in, or lifecycle analysis (Dermentzoudis, 2004).  
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) managed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce established the Standard Test Methods for Responsive Robots. The 
test program’s objective is to “measure a baseline of robot/operator capabilities necessary to 
perform operation tasks defined by the user” (Jacof et al., 2013). The tests are designed to project 
whether the robot can perform operationally through testing. 
 The NIST testing strategy encompasses SUAS below 2 kg, 30 knot speed, and frangible 
composition. Specific SUAS test include station keeping in both horizontal and vertical 
positions, endurance and power test for a set path, and safety tests of impact and lost 
communication behavior. In addition to SUAS tests, NIST test sensor performance including 
latency, range, audio, color accuracy, and mapping. The overall system test  “measures robot, 
maneuvering, mobility, manipulation, sensing, endurance, radio communication, durability, 
reliability, logistics, and safety”(Jacof et al., 2013), with a goal of providing quantitative data for 
different platforms to support operator training, purchase decisions, and operational 
performance. Individual test trials are run to achieve 80 % reliability with 80% confidence. Tests 
are run in 30 repetitions and only 3 failures of meeting test objectives are allowed for statistical 
significance (Jacof et al., 2013).  
A fault condition is defined as “A failure of the robotic system preventing completion of 
10 or more continuous repetitions. This could include a stuck or disabled vehicle requiring 
maintenance, or software issues at the remote operator control unit. All such failures are 
catalogued during testing to help identify recurring issues.” (Jacof, 2017). Figure 8 details the 
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NIST methodology for SUAS testing. The first testing mode is elemental, focusing on individual 
capabilities for the system and repeatable outcomes. The system then graduates to combination 
testing of capabilities to determine system tradeoffs and performance. Finally, the system is 
tested in operational scenarios where variables are uncontrolled aiding in predicting performance 
for a representative environment (Jacof, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 8. NIST Test Methodology for SUAS (Jacof, 2017) 
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Component Variation SUAS-Trades 
 This section will evaluate the design and component variation with SUASs. The focus is 
on the multirotor platform family powered by lithium polymer batteries. This focus aligns with 
the analysis section and keeps the scope focused.  
 Frame design variations predominately revolve around the number of motors used. 
Bicopter includes two rotors, tricopeter include three rotors, quadcopter includes four rotors, and 
so on up to octocopter. The higher the number of motors the more lift the platform can generate, 
equating to larger payload capability. 
 More motors also equate to redundancy and increase system robustness. For example, a 
hexacopter (six rotors) can theoretically have three motors go out and still be recovered, if the 
non-functioning motors are opposite of each other. Downsides to increasing the number of rotors 
are larger platform size and weight, decreased power efficiency, larger costs, reduced 
transportability, and additional parts/maintenance (Liang, 2016). The most popular 
configurations for multirotors are even number builds: quad, hexa, and octo. Even build 
multirotors alternate the spin direction to cancel out torque forces to stay balanced in flight 
(Liang, 2016). Quadcopters benefit from being light and small but will fail in flight immediately 
if a single motor fails. Hexacopters and octocopters benefit from motor redundancy and 
increased lift.  
 Multirotor drones can fly at high speeds, perform vertical take-offs and landings, and 
excel at surveillance (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017). Loiter or hover positions are not ideal for 
endurance due to the high-power consumption for stabilized flight.  With the multiplicity of 
motors, the operators has a high level of control of movements which enables the platform to be 
extremely agile and responsive (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017). Focus must be paid to pairing 
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motors and propellers in alignment with the air vehicles size and weight to gain optimal 
efficiency of the rotors. Multirotors also benefit from simplified control systems promoting 
lower complexity and higher reliability (Hassanalian & Abdelkefi, 2017).   
 Future trends project that SUASs will continue to reduce in size and weight. Most of the 
improvements will come from the hobby industry due to market demand and supply. Higher 
energy density in fuel choices, including batteries, will increase endurance and range (Herrera, 
Dechant, Green, & Klein, 2017) . Herrera also details that capabilities will continue to increase 
due to advancement in other industries and suppliers including robotics, communication, power, 
sensors, and networking. Projections are that SUASs will eventually be able to carry more 
payload than the air vehicle weight (Herrera et al., 2017). Additionally, Herrera states, vehicles 
will continue to be more autonomous with an increase of intra platform data management and 
sharing; task distribution will shift from the operational user to the air vehicle and increased 
autonomy will lead to SUAS swarming functionality. Swarming capability establishes a 
paradigm shift in SUAS enabling new functionality: large scale mapping, coordinated attack, and 
communication relays (Herrera et al., 2017). The improvements listed above all point to an 
increase of operational mission sets for SUAS in the near future.     
Design for Multiple Functions 
 One large benefit of UASs are their ability to be customizable and flexible to different 
mission sets and functions. Size, weight, and power trades within the UAS architecture provide 
options for the air vehicle to increase performance dependent on the mission set. One way this is 
realized is through the ability to swap payloads to gain alternative functionality of 
reconnaissance, munitions, night time imagery, environment measurement, payload delivery, etc.  
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Different payloads can impact system weight, communication, level of autonomy, and 
range requirement. These changes effect design and drive the need for modular adaptable 
platforms to keep cost low and mission flexibility high. To achieve this platform flexibility “a 
parameterized product line architecture can be used to capture system commonalities while 
expressing variabilities in physical characteristics such as navigation, collision avoidance, flight 
control, remote command and control, communication, and telemetry.” (Madni, 2012) . Madni 
explains the system should be reconfigurable dynamically, enabling swappable components 
without inducing failure modes.  
The process of platform selection and final configuration would involve selection of an 
overarching concept of operations (CONOP) which involves specific mission profiles. Then a 
product line architecture (PLAS) is created which supports the various mission profiles, or a 
family of profiles. PLAS promotes reduced time to deployment, reduced cost, increased 
productivity, superior quality, simplified training, reduced logistics, increased competition, and 
leverage of human capital (Madni, 2012). 
 Fricke and Schulz (2005) detail that the changeability of a system is distinguished by four 
aspects: flexibility, adaptability, agility, and robustness. During the concept development phase 
trades can be performed between these aspects to gain design options or trade space to better 
align with operator requirements. Flexibility is defined as “the measure of how easily a system’s 
capabilities can be modified in response to external change.”(Ryan, Jacques, & Colombi, 2013) 
The first key components of this definition is the measure of ease, defined by Ryan (2010) as 
time or money. The second is capabilities, defined as “value assessment of the desired system 
characteristic” (Ryan et al., 2013). Values should align with system prioritized requirements.  
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 Adaptability is defined as “the measure of how effectively a system can modify its own 
capabilities in response to change after it has been fielded” (Ryan et al., 2013). Critical to this 
definition is the measure of how effectively the system can modify itself. Agility is contrasted 
with adaptability, “the system’s ability to be change rapidly, where changes from external 
sources must be implemented to cope with changing environment” (Fricke & Schulz, 2005). 
Finally, robustness is “a systems ability to be insensitive towards changing environments, where 
intended functionality is delivered under varying operating conditions” (Fricke & Schulz, 2005). 
System design can influence the amount of robustness a system requires by defining the 
operational criteria or bounds early in the design process. Figure 9 summarizes the four aspects 
of changeability, showing that trades can be performed across the aspects to determine degree of 
changeability required and the degree of external change allowed.   
   
Figure 9. The Four Aspects of Changeability (Fricke & Schulz, 2005) 
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 Another critical concept in SUAS design is modularity. “Modules are units in a larger 
system that are structurally independent of one another, but work together” (Baldwin & Clark, 
2000). The SUAS’s frame is what provides an architecture to integrate modules to perform 
functions and task. Modularity can mitigate system complexity by isolating systems to modules 
which reliably perform their assigned tasks. Simple interfaces connect the modules together in a 
manner which reduces task loading to the operator.  Current examples of modules within SUASs 
are propulsion system (motor and propeller pair), 4 in one electronic speed controllers, flight 
computer, payloads, and GPS. 
 Modularity for a system is managed by six module operators. These operators are 
implementation methods for design which enable functions of the system. The operators are: 
splitting or segmenting into modules, substituting modules, adding modules, excluding modules, 
creating new design rules, and connecting modules (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Benefits of 
modularity in SUAS include: isolation of fault analysis to a component with proper 
characterization, multiple component swaps at a given time for a design cycle or mission plan, 
and flexibility for future tasks (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  
 In additional to multiple functionality, SUASs have many target operators within the 
DoD. The target career field for SUASs include: Security Forces, Civil Engineering, Special 
Operations, Battlefield Airman, Firefighter, Office of Special Investigation, Intelligence, Combat 
Camera, and Weather (U.S. Air Force, 2016). These groups of warfighters will use SUASs in 
either duress or non-duress situations and in austere or non-austere locations. 
 A duress situation means the systems needs to be intuitive, rapidly deployable, and 
highly reliable. Increased complexity, measured in time to gain functionality, is undesirable due 
to the value weighting of the user’s time. Austere locations place emphasis on the characteristics 
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of reliability, transportability, availability, ease of repair. Reliability can be allocated to 
individual parts or subsystem driving factors of how many spare parts are required, mean time to 
repair, and system design life. Furthermore, low reliability can stress the logistical system in 
austere locations causing systems to be inoperable if supplies are inadequate.  
Transportability can be allocated to system weight, size, modularity, and durability. The 
system needs to be the right size and weight to be transported and then assembled at the location, 
while still performing its required mission. System design life must also be considered; is the 
system designed for 6 months or a year? If the system has a shorter lifespan have considerations 
been established for system resupply? If the system has a longer lifespan what is the repair plan 
like? These questions must be answered early in the design process to ensure functions correctly 
for the operator.  
Summary  
 This literature review has documented findings that provide system engineering input for 
SUASs concept development. Focus was shown on developing critical system functions which 
are in alignment with mission profiles. The concept development process success is heavily 
dependent on identifying potential system faults and criticality of faults; these faults must then be 
traced and assigned to subsystems or components for documentation. Reliability provides a 
measure of probability the SUAS will perform a system function. The measurement of reliability 
is performed at the component level and assimilated to the system level for given functions, 
where increasing the number of components has a large effect on overall reliability. 
Documentation was provided by NIST on current methodologies employed on measuring SUAS 
reliability.  
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 Multirotor SUASs provide excellent platforms for system modularity, specifically the 
number of motors/propellers and size. This enables agility and flexibility for the system for 
evolving mission sets and unintended future uses. Modularity also promotes traceable reliability 
to specific modules when coupled with fault analysis. When designing a SUAS, focus must be 
paid to the operational user, their background, and the environment they will face. The system 
must align with these characteristics to be useful tool. The better the match between the ease of 
use of the system and multiple functionality, the better the system will perform. The mission set 
is continuously evolving for SUASs and smart system design must be employed to harness new 
technology and push the bound of operational effectiveness for the warfighter.  
 The next section of this paper, Chapter III, will discuss the methods for performing a 
concept development for a SUAS. The chapter will outline how to define and appropriate 
reference missions. Then it will detail the system engineering methodology used for the analysis 
focusing on important aspects of design trades, critical faults, and functionality allocation. The 
method section will discuss reliability rating for component and system level parts and how they 
are found, measured, and documented.  
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III. Methods 
Chapter Overview 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a Small Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS) product 
development design template for military program offices, outputting critical SUAS components, 
operator checklists, reliability analysis, and a hazard matrix to aid in the development of a 
reliable SUAS that meets mission requirements. The product development process is split into 
two sections, Mission/System Alignment and System Design. Mission/System Alignment 
focuses on a generalized system engineering process to align stakeholder’s initial design criteria 
with a reliable system design. This process develops operator checklists that mitigate critical 
faults, promoting reliable system performance in operational conditions. The second section, 
System Design, focuses on establishing trade space from developed requirements in the 
Mission/System Alignment section, and follows a system design process to output a SUAS 
design that meets established requirements. Both processes are meant to be repeatable and 
simplistic using SUAS components and architectures that are available commercially. The 
following chapter provides system engineering techniques and trades which enable the analysis 
to be performed in Chapter 4.  
Theory  
 The system engineering process is used to establish a methodology and progress through 
a design analysis. Concepts include identification of stakeholder(s), development of a design 
reference mission, system requirements, functional allocation, fault tree analysis, reliability 
analysis, physical allocation, trade space analysis, and requirement analysis. The goal of the 
process is to define a system that meets, at a minimum, threshold requirement aligned with 
stakeholder definition.  
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Figure 10 shows the Initial DoD System Engineering Process on which the SUAS 
product design process was based. Process inputs involve customer or stakeholders needs, 
mission type, mission environment, available technology, and project constraints. The 
requirement analysis is used to translate customer requirements into functional and performance 
requirements that can be measured and documented. Functional analysis allocates down system 
functions to the lowest level and then maps those functions to documented requirements. This 
process allows the system designer to understand what the system is doing and how it is doing it, 
leading to selection and optimization of physical components. Design synthesis establishes a 
physical architecture based on information from the requirement analysis and functional analysis. 
Components must map to functions that then map to requirements, the process is iterative 
balancing requirements with a functional architecture and physical design. System analysis and 
control is used to measure the progress of the design alternatives against requirements. Inputs to 
this process occur at all points within the system engineering process. The system analysis 
ensures design impacts are measured, documented, traced, and evaluated providing critical 
information for final design selection (DAU, 2017).  
 
Figure 10. Initial DoD System Engineering Process Model (DAU, 2017) 
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Material and Equipment  
Modeling was the primary tool for developing the system, performing component trades, 
and analyzing requirements. The system modeling tool used was Cameo Systems Modeler 
version 18.5. This tool enabled the building and augmentation of various system level views. 
Views documented include: System Functional Allocation, Physical Architecture, Internal Block 
Diagram, and Use Case. These views from Cameo Systems Modeler are presented in analysis 
section of this thesis. For predicting failure modes of the proposed SUAS architectures a free 
fault tree analyzer was used to document fault traceability to components (ALD, 2018). 
Microsoft Excel was leveraged to capture fault tree tables, document requirements, build 
operator checklists, establish design trades, and perform component reliability analysis. Focus 
was placed on using tools available to military program offices to ensure a repeatable and 
distributable process.  
Procedures and Process  
 The overall system design process is outlined in Figure 11. The process is split into two 
sections. The first section is the Mission/System Alignment process which involves stakeholders 
and a program office working together to define the mission and requirements for the SUAS 
system, where the program office includes program managers and engineers. In this section, the 
critical functions are defined by the program office, these are functions that must be performed 
by the system to successfully complete the defined mission. Next, fault tree diagrams are used to 
map the critical functions to components and identify potential failures. Fault tree diagrams 
enable the program office and stakeholders to identify critical system components and to build 
operator checklists. The operator checklists mitigate system risk prior to mission deployment of 
the SUAS and ensure the most reliable in-flight performance. Program management tool outputs 
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of this Mission/System Alignment are critical component reliability analysis and a hazard matrix 
which promote system reliability monitoring.  
 The second section is the System Design. This process is performed by the program 
office team once the design documents have been created. The design process involves building 
a system physical architecture, a design checklist, and establishment of a design trade space. 
These system level products provide an architecture, rule set, and trade space to select SUAS 
componentry. The component selection process is cyclical and requires constant evaluation of 
design trades and requirement evaluation. The system design process constrains componentry as 
the design is matured. Once the system is designed, system budgets are developed for frequency, 
weight, and power informing the requirements analysis process. Finally, the reliability analysis 
performed in the Mission/System Alignment section paired with the physical architecture 
provides input for a system reliability analysis. This process allows the program office and 
stakeholders to own the technical baseline for the SUAS system, providing critical system level 
architectures and analysis to inform future design decisions or design iterations.  
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Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process 
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Identify the Stakeholders  
 For the design process to be successful, the stakeholders of the system must be 
understood. The main stakeholders in this design process are the operators of the systems, as 
they have the most interaction with the system. For this design Special Forces operators are 
considered the main stakeholder. An interview was conducted with USAF 371st Special 
Operations Combat Training Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1, who performs user training for 
DoD special operators, security contractor personnel, and security forces on SUAS platforms. 
Initial design criteria discussed in this conversation included: low system weight, quick set up 
time, low audible signature, intuitive use, quick reparability. Section IV will operationalize these 
stakeholder requirements in more detail.  
Define Design Reference Missions 
 The next step within the Mission/System Alignment section is to define reference 
missions for the SUAS to be designed to. The design reference mission evaluated within this 
paper is Information Superiority. This mission aligns the United States Air Force SUAS Flight 
Plan: 2016-2036 and is focused on collecting enemy video surveillance for force protection, 
offensive maneuvering, or general intelligence (U.S. Air Force, 2016). Design of the reference 
mission is performed by the stakeholders and the program office to ensure the operators and 
designers of the system are in complete alignment of mission priorities. 
 The reference mission defines an overall Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and operator 
use cases for the system. These products provide a medium to transfer operator and design team 
system mission definition into physical products. After these system documents are created, 
design requirements are established for the system to be evaluated against. Requirements must be 
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound, allowing for a stable evaluation points 
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for the designed system. Additionally, the performance requirements are defined at threshold and 
objective level. Threshold levels must be met for the system to perform the mission while 
objective levels are the desired capability from the stakeholder. Requirements are prioritized and 
aligned with stakeholder initial design criteria. This places emphasis on certain design points 
influencing important trades in the System Design process.  
Critical Functions of the SUAS 
 After identifying the needs of the stakeholder and the mission set for the system, critical 
functions can be established. Functions are designed and diagrammed within Cameo Systems 
Modeler using a functional architecture model. Critical functions are defined as any function 
which must occur to provide use or functionality to the operator. Use or functionality of the 
system is then defined by the initial design criteria, the reference mission CONOPS, and 
requirements. Top-level critical functions include: flight, operator control, and payload 
capability. These functions must be all be realized by the system in order to provide use to the 
stakeholders.  
Failure Modes  
 With critical functions identified, failure modes can be defined and listed which prevent 
the functions from occurring. Failure modes for SUASs were researched from hobbyist websites, 
technical reports, and case studies. Criticality of occurrence falls into three categories. Category I 
is an unrecoverable event, where SUAS system failure is imminent or repair time for the system 
to regain functionality is unacceptable to the user. Category II is a functionality degraded event, 
meaning the SUAS can perform system use cases albeit at a degraded level. Category III is a 
recoverable event, meaning the SUAS can be recovered and repaired within a time acceptable to 
a user. Fault tree diagrams and tables were developed to show traceability from a component to a 
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critical function. Fault tree tables provide input to operator checklists, which the operator can 
complete prior to flight to mitigate system risk. These checklists promote a reliable system by 
eliminating operator, environmental, and component induced risks before flight.  
Failure rates for critical components that induce category I events were researched. 
Components investigated were motors, propellers, battery elimination circuits (BEC), electronic 
speed controllers, lithium polymer batteries, flight computers, GPS, vehicle frames, 
cameras/sensors (ESC), electrical systems, and radio receivers/transmitters. Failure rates were 
documented as field events, researched events, or subject matter expert event. Failure rates are 
listed as failures per hour and are static probabilities, assumed to be within the constant failure 
rate of the bath tub curve (defined in Chapter IV). The assumption ignores infant mortality or 
early component wear out, stressing that either the manufacture of the component or the user, 
tests the components prior to system integration. Corresponding component reliabilities can be 
aggregated for subsystems and evaluated in the physical architecture and integrated block 
diagram steps for an overall system reliability. A hazard matrix was built combining the failure 
rates of a component and the category of event to the system. The hazard matrix aids the 
program office in making decisions that mitigate risks to critical system components.  
Generate Checklists 
 Fault tree diagrams and tables provide insight into the failures for the SUAS system. 
From these insights, operator checklists were developed to mitigate failures prior to mission 
deployment. The checklists developed were a pre-flight checklist, a pre-deployment checklist, an 
initial flight checklist, and a spares checklist. The pre-flight checklist is designed to be performed 
at the deployment location before any flight; the checklist items requires a low time commitment 
from the operator. The pre-deployment checklist is performed prior to forward deployment at a 
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secure location and requires a medium time commitment from the operator. The initial flight 
checklist is performed in a controlled environment when the baseline configuration of the SUAS 
is altered. This checklist requires a high time commitment from the operator with the design 
team’s assistance. The spares checklist is a recommended deployment kit to have if additional 
transport weight is permitted. It is focused on providing replacement for components which 
induce category I events.   
Physical Architecture 
 The System Design process starts with creating a design checklist to inform the physical 
architecture of the system. The design checklist provides a ruleset on components for the 
program office to design the system in accordance with. This checklist is the most general of the 
physical architecture products and provides best practices for designing multirotor SUASs. It 
captures rules from the authors experience, online drone blogs, and members within AFIT’s 
Autonomous Navigation and Technology (ANT) Lab.   
 The next product developed is the physical architecture. This diagram is built with 
Cameo Systems Modeler and shows how the components within the SUAS connect and interact 
with each other. The architecture provides a framework for the program office to identify critical 
interaction and trades to increase system alignment with the requirements. The physical 
architecture is meant to be modified throughout the system design process, as trades are 
identified. A more specific view of the physical architecture is the internal block diagram (IBD). 
This view identifies system ports which connect components, shows how information is 
transferred within the system, and identifies central system nodes. The view provides valuable 
insight into how design trades can be implemented and the potential impact to the system. 
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 Evaluating both the design checklist and physical architecture views against the design 
documents reveals design trade space. The design trade space identifies architecture, 
configuration, or component trades which the system designer can implement to increase certain 
performance aspects of the system while decreasing others. As the program office progresses 
through the system design process, they can go back to the design trade space to boost 
performance areas that are below requirement threshold values. Each time a trade is accepted the 
design team must ensure the physical architecture models are updated. This process is complete 
when “builder thinks the system can be built to the client’s satisfaction” (Maier & Rechtin, 
2009). 
Component Selection  
 With the system architecture established components are then selected to fill the 
architecture. Components that impact the architecture the most are selected first. Each successful 
component selection constrains follow on component categories and may constrain none, one, or 
many other component categories. The component selection process benefits from identification 
of critical components completed in the Mission/System Alignment phase, as special attention is 
paid to components that have the highest impact on failure modes. Importance is placed on 
selecting components with trusted reputation among the commercial drone industry and 
components that provide detail specification and test data for follow on analysis. As the program 
office moves through the component selection process the overall system is refined and the 
design trade space shrinks. Components evaluated for the multirotor SUAS are frames, motors, 
ESCs, propellers, flight computers, video transmitters, camera systems, power systems, remote 
control systems, and ground control station (GCS).  
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Develop Budgets 
 With the components selected for the SUAS, budgets for weight, frequency, and power 
are developed. The weight budget is important for transportation limits established within the 
design requirement. The weight also is an important input to endurance calculations for the 
designed system. The frequency budget ensures the remote control, flight computer, and video 
transmitter systems are allocated within individual frequency bands, preventing command and 
control errors within flight. The power budget determines the current draw (mA) and voltage 
range (V) required for the system. Power levels determine the number and type of BECs required 
for the system along with non-motor power demands of the system or auxiliary power draw. The 
power budget also provides input into endurance calculations.  
System Reliability  
 With the physical components selected and budgets established a reliability analysis is 
then performed. Failure rates researched for critical components performed in the 
Mission/System Alignment section are identified in the physical architecture, creating a 
reliability block diagram for the SUAS system. For ease of calculations, the reliability block 
diagrams are broken into subsystems based on critical functions. System components are either 
in series or parallel configuration based on established requirements. Series configuration allows 
for a lower system weight but puts the system at risk for a single point of failure. Parallel 
configuration adds in redundancy for the system at the cost of higher weight and overall 
complexity. Outputs of the reliability analysis are critical subsystem reliabilities, overall system 
reliability, system mean time to failure (MTTF), and probability to complete operational the 
mission.  
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Requirements Analysis 
 The final step of the System Design process is to perform a requirements analysis. The 
designed system is evaluated against requirements established in the Mission System/Alignment 
phase. The analysis proceeds through each requirement and projects how the design system will 
meet or fail to meet threshold and object values. Information for the analysis is collected from 
component manufacturing specifications, online websites/blogs, and subject matter expert input. 
Engineering calculations are required for certain requirements like flight endurance, image pixel 
density, and video latency. If certain requirements are unable to be met by the current design, the 
program office must revisit sections in the system design process to improve the design. If 
program office personnel and the stakeholders approve the requirement analysis, the design can 
move into production and system testing. This allows for the theoretical values of the 
requirements analysis to be proven out by the system.  
Conclusion  
 This section has outlined a product development process for a SUAS to be designed to a 
specific reference mission and was detailed in two sections: Mission/System Alignment and 
System Design. Mission/System Alignment focuses on mapping design criteria established by 
system stakeholder to critical functions of the system. Critical functions of the system lend to 
fault trees being established that help identify critical components and failure mode criticality. 
The main output of this process is operator-based checklists, designed to mitigate risk to the 
SUAS before flight. With user and environmental errors mitigated before flight, the system 
reliability can be attributed to critical components that perform critical functions. These failure 
rates for such components have been researched and documented in Chapter IV. System Design 
focuses on establishing trade space from developed requirements in the Mission/System 
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Alignment and following a system design process to output a specific system that meets 
established requirements. This product development process is repeatable for any type of SUAS 
mission, establishing a tool that can be used by program office to build reliable SUAS for 
specific mission sets.  
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IV. Analysis  
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter discusses the implementation of the SUAS product development process 
established in Chapter III. The overall product development process is show in Figure 11. Each 
section of this chapter starts with a zoomed in figure of the step being addressed within the 
process. Steps within the process are color coded according to participant involvement, red 
involves stakeholders, purple involves stakeholders and the program office, and blue involves the 
program office only. The product development process is split into two sections, Mission/System 
Alignment and System Design. Mission/System Alignment focuses on a generalized system 
engineering process to align stakeholder’s initial design criteria with a reliable system design. 
This process develops operator checklists that mitigate critical faults, promoting reliable system 
performance in operational conditions. The second section, System Design, establishes trade 
space from developed requirements in the Mission/System Alignment section and follows a 
system design process to output a specific system that meets established requirements. The 
following chapter progresses through the SUAS product development process for an Information 
Superiority mission focused on collecting enemy video surveillance for force protection, 
offensive maneuvering, or general intelligence. 
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Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process 
Mission/System Alignment  
Identify the Stakeholders  
 
Figure 12. Initial Design Criteria section of Mission/System Alignment 
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USAF 371st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1 performs 
user training for DoD special operators, security contractor personnel, and security forces on 
SUAS platforms. In an interview performed August 2018 with Detachment 1, system desires for 
SUAS platforms were discussed. The conversation started with asking for recommendations for 
the design methodology for SUASs specifically for special operator’s use. It was stated that the 
current methodology of treating SUAS as aircraft focusing on airworthiness for long hours is 
flawed since SUAS are orders of magnitude lighter and cheaper than traditional aircraft. SUAS’s 
should instead be treated as tools. A tool focus allows for intuitive and reliable design focused on 
very specific functions allowing for simple solutions to solve a mission need. Furthermore, teams 
need to move away from dedicating one to two SUAS operators and embrace the flexibility of all 
members performing SUAS operations. With his methodology stated operator design 
requirements for a SUAS system were then discussed. 
 The first design requirement discussed was simplicity; special operators desire a system that 
can be unpacked, assembled, and launched in a matter of minutes and operated with limited 
initial training. Detachment 1 stated that there is a desire for the baseline military SUASs to be as 
complicated as commercial off the shelf (COTs) drones, where the system is designed for an 
average consumer and is flown within hours of purchase. This would allow 371st SOCTS to 
focus on training the functionality of the system, including enhanced sensors, user interfaces, 
software modules, etc.  
The next design requirement detailed was the overall utility of the system. Utility of the 
system must outweigh the detriments the system places on the operational user, specifically, 
pack weight, setup time, and user involvement. This relationship drives a design which performs 
a few functions well while minimizing user detriments.  
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Another design requirement discussed was user dependency. Special operators do not want to 
be overly reliant on a system. Over reliance can manifest itself in the form of interfacing with the 
system reducing environmental situational awareness, recovery of the SUAS in order to continue 
mission, and destruction of the SUAS to prevent enemy intelligence gathering. The special 
operators should be able to continue and succeed with a degraded or destructed SUAS.  
The final requirement discussed was betrayal. It was stated that the system shall prevent 
betrayal of the special operation team, where the system mitigates detection by the enemy and 
protects the operator. Prevention of betrayal includes a low audible signature, intelligence 
preservation, and safe operations. The discussion above drove the initial design criteria, which 
must be considered for a successful design.  
1. Simplicity: the number of parts the operator must interact with to operate or repair the 
system should be low and intuitive. The user interface to control the system shall have 
critical functions only and be intuitive. Time is the operator’s most valuable resource.  
2. Utility: Design focus shall be placed on performing one or two functions maximizing 
reliability. A system that performs a large amount of functions at the expense of the 
operator’s time, situational awareness, or mobility is valued lower than a system which 
performs a few functions timely, simply, and lightly.  
3. Dependency: Functions which are critical to mission success shall be able to be repaired 
quickly. Recovery of the system needs to be optional due to increase threat presence. 
Burden placed on the user from the system shall be minimized including recovery, 
operation, setup, transport, deployment, and information transfer.  
4. Betrayal: The system shall prevent betrayal to the special operations team. Mitigations 
shall be integrated into the system to reduce noise footprint, intelligence preservation, 
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rapid deploy and stow, and safe handling. If the system promotes increased risk to the 
user, it reduces usefulness.  
Define Design Reference Missions 
 
Figure 13. Design Document Process 
 
  The mission selected for this analysis is Information Superiority or Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). In this mission a SUAS provides forward deployed 
ground-based units the capability to conduct low altitude, ISR and human and vehicle tracking 
operations from a safe standoff distance with minimal logistical support. Specifically, the use of 
the SUAS will allow operators to: 
 Rapidly setup and deploy SUAS from austere location 
 Covertly loiter over a desired target area, providing uninterrupted, or near-
continuous video coverage over a target for a 30-minute interval 
 Continuously track a moving human or vehicle within operating range 
 Utilize payloads optimized for low altitude operations capable of providing 
sufficient resolution for target identification 
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 Monitor ISR data from safe standoff distance 
 Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the 
location around the operator 
 Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations 
Figure 14 displays a SysML use case diagram created in Cameo Systems Modeler, showing the 
set of actions or use cases the system will perform in conjunction with external users or actors of 
the system. The system is only in one use case at a time but can transfer across cases. In the ISR 
mission the use cases and actors are the following: 
Actors: Operator, Target, Ground Control Station, GPS 
 Perform Setup: The operator secures the launch location, unpacks the SUAS and 
required equipment. The operator assembles any required parts and perform setup 
checklist.  
 Plan Mission: Included within the Perform Setup use case is the Plan Mission use 
case. The operator programs the ground control station with desired mission 
points and writes them to the SUAS flight computer. Plan mission is also included 
in the Loiter, Launch and Ingress, Acquire Target, and Perform Setup use cases. 
Where an include relationship is defined as “having some partial behavior that is 
common across several use cases.” (Larman, 2006) 
 Launch and Ingress: Operator confirms GPS lock is acquired if required for 
mission. Then the operator commands the SUAS to move to the first mission 
point. 
 Loiter: This is the default case if the SUAS is not acquiring a target, performing 
surveillance, performing ingress or egress. The SUAS loiters and transmits video 
at a preprogramed altitude and awaits commands for the operator.  
 Acquire Target: The operator identifies target through the ground control station 
and commands the SUAS to follow the target and perform surveillance. 
 Perform Surveillance: The SUAS streams video back to the operator of the target. 
The SUAS follows the target as it moves within its operating radius. 
 Egress and Recover: SUAS is commanded by operator to return to base or land at 
coordinate points. Failsafe mode of auto land or return to base if battery is below 
5% is programed during Plan Mission phase.  
 Ditch: SUAS can be ditched at any time during an in-flight mission, preventing 
betrayal to special operators. Ditch mode can be induced by the operator or pre-
programed failsafe. 
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Figure 14. ISR Use Case Diagram  
 
The next step of defining a design reference mission is to establish and prioritize 
requirements for the system to be designed to. Requirements have objective and threshold values 
for the system. Objective requirements are desires or performance goals for the system to meet. 
Threshold requirements must be met for the system to provide use to the operational user. The 
space between objective and threshold requirements establishes design space for system trades. 
Requirements should be established with input from the operational user, but the system designer 
must ensure the requirements are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-related. The 
design criteria defined by the operational user aids in prioritization of requirements. In the case 
of the ISR system the user desires a system that is simple to use and set up, keeps them safe, 
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performs ISR reliably, and operates independently. In prioritizing requirements, the user’s 
perspective must be kept in mind. Since this system will be used by special operator in a 
contested environment, time equates to life or death. In turn, from a system designer perspective 
emphasis must be placed on those requirements that, if unmet, will force the user to abandon the 
system.   
Table 2 shows example ISR requirements with threshold and objective values. 
Requirements were established and expounded from the AFIT SUAS design sequence, reference 
CONOPS, which is provided in Appendix C.  Each requirement is prioritized with a descending 
priority. The first ten prioritized requirements are influence by the user’s design criteria of 
simplicity, utility, dependency, or betrayal. Failure of meeting these ten requirements would 
immediately prevent the user from using the system due to a mission safety concern. Therefore, 
in designing the system these requirements must be considered first.  
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Table 2. ISR Design Requirements 
Requirement  Description  Objective  Threshold  
Priority 
Level 
Design 
Criteria  
ISR-1 
Setup of system from unpacking to 
ready for launch shall be 5 min 10 min 2 Simplicity  
ISR-2 
Mission planning time from 
coordinates provided to operator to 
ready for launch 5 min 10 min 3 Simplicity  
ISR-3 Operators required for setup  1 2 5 Dependency 
ISR-4 
System shall have a range from 
deployment location of  2 miles 1 mile 11   
ISR-5 
System shall provide resolution for 
tracking a vehicle    
30 
pixels/݉ଶ 7 Utility  
ISR-6 
System shall loiter over the target 
and provide 10 minutes video of 
target for  
100% of 
time 
85% of 
time 8 Utility  
ISR-7 System shall transmit geo-location to   15 ft  17   
ISR-8 
System shall require dedicated 
operators for control and operations 1 2 6 Dependency 
ISR-9 
Operator shall be able to identify 
ground targets while controlling 
vehicle    X 10 Utility  
ISR-10 
System shall display near real time 
imagery to the operator(s) 2 sec delay 5 sec delay  12   
ISR-11 
Operators required for recovery, 
landing, and retrieval of the system  0 1 18   
ISR-12 
Endurance of the system while 
transferring video shall be  60 minutes  45 minutes 9 Utility  
ISR-13  
System shall perform "return launch" 
if communication is lost with 
operator   X 15   
ISR-14  
System shall indicate to operator if 
GPS is lost and allow for manual 
recovery mode   X 14   
ISR-15 
System shall provide status of 
battery to operator   X 13   
ISR-16  
System altitude shall be greater than 
100 ft except at launch and recovery    X 19   
ISR-17 
System shall have the capability 
swapping in a night capable camera 
of 0.001 LUX or lower X   16   
ISR-18 
System shall have a low noise 
profile of 50 db or lower at 
minimum safe flight altitude   X 4 Betrayal 
ISR-19 
Air vehicle shall weigh less than 5kg 
and be packable in 2 standard ruck 
sacks 22" X 14" X 9"    X 1 Utility  
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Critical Functions of the SUAS 
 
Figure 15. Critical Function Process 
 
 Critical functions are defined as functions that must be performed for the SUAS to 
provide capability to the operator. At the top level these functions are: Flight, Transport, Power, 
Control, and Surveillance. If any of these functions are unable to be performed, then the entire 
system is unusable for the operator. Figure 16 displays the functional allocation of the SUAS 
system. The critical functions are broken down into different levels, with lower level functions 
enabling the top-level functions. For example, the top-level function of flight is enabled by 
generate lift, provide stability, launch, and recover. If one or more lower level functions are 
unrealized for the system, then the top-level function is either unrealized or degraded.  
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Functions colored green shown in Figure 16, are functions that attribute degraded 
performance to top level functions if unrealized, while functions in light orange force the top-
level functions to be unrealized. In the instance of the top-level function of flight, when recovery 
is unrealized then flight is degraded, meaning the function still has use to the operator. 
Conversely, if generate lift is unrealized so too is flight and therefore the system unable to 
provide capability to the operator. System design will focus on preventing failures for the lower 
level orange functions or critical functions. Descriptions of each function are described in Table 
3.       
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Figure 16. Functional Allocation of ISR SUAS System 
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Table 3. Functional Description of ISR SUAS System 
Top Tier Function  Second Tier Function Description Critical 
Flight  
Generate Lift 
SUAS shall create lift for a vantage point to 
enable increased situational awareness for the 
operator. X 
Provide Stability  
SUAS shall remain stable while airborne enabling 
controlled flight for the operator. X 
Launch 
SUAS shall be commanded to launch by the 
operator and transition from launch to flight. X 
Recover and Reuse 
SUAS shall be commanded to recover by operator 
and transition from flight to recovery/landing.   
Transport Pack and Store 
SUAS shall be man packable for transport. SUAS 
shall be assembled and disassembled from the 
stored state and prepared for launch by operator.  X 
Power 
Monitor 
Operator shall be able to monitor the power levels 
of the SUAS while in flight.   
Distribute SUAS shall distribute power to components. X 
Regulate 
SUAS shall regulate required voltage levels to 
components X 
Store SUAS shall store energy on board the aircraft. X 
Surveillance 
Observe Environment 
SUAS requires sensor to visually observe the 
environment. X 
Transmit and Receive  
SUAS shall transmit sensor data down to the 
operator. X 
Human Interface 
Operator shall be able to process and record data 
from the sensor including: GPS coordinates, 
target type, speed, etc.   
Control 
Payload Control 
Operator shall have control over functions within 
the payload i.e. movement, zoom, filter. X 
Flight Control 
Operator shall have control over flight of the 
SUAS. X 
Failsafe 
SUAS shall have a failsafe programmed if control 
is lost from the operator. Failsafe’s include return 
to launch point, auto land, or self-destruct. X 
Guidance 
SUAS shall have GPS guidance system for semi-
autonomous flight.   
Provide Status  
Operator shall receive status from the SUAS 
including air speed, altitude, heading, and current 
flight mode.   
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Fault Tree Analysis  
 
Figure 17. Failure Mode Analysis 
 
 Critical functions of the SUAS were then placed into Fault Tree Analysis diagrams 
enabling the following benefits to the conceptual design process (Schenkelberg, 2018): 
 Identification of failures deductively through sequencing of events 
 Highlighting important elements of the system in relation to system failure 
 Establishing figures for system analysis  
 Evaluating failure modes one at a time 
 Revealing system behavior and interactions 
Failures are attributed to system components and assigned categories. Three categories were 
established which measure the impact or criticality to the overall system if the failure occurs. 
Category I is an unrecoverable event, meaning the SUAS can no longer be flown with system 
failure imminent. Repair time for the system to regain functionality is too high for the operator to 
accept. The amount of time is dependent on operational conditions; in a contested environment 
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the allowable repair time will be lower than in a non-contested environment. Category II is a 
functionality degraded event, meaning the SUAS can perform system use cases, albeit at a 
degraded level. Category III is a recoverable event; repair time required is within tolerance for 
the operator. From an operator’s perspective, category I events end the mission for the SUAS 
and must be prevented. Category II events may be tolerated by the operator depending on the 
system degradation. For example, an intolerable event would include a gain tuning failure for 
stable flight control between the ground control station and flight computer which degrades 
flight control to the point that stable video is unable to be viewed at threshold level of 85% loiter 
time. An example of a tolerable event would be if the remote-control feature of the air vehicle 
failed but the autopilot mode still functioned. Category III events may be resolved by the system 
itself or with assistance from the operator via recovery, or transmitted command. For mitigated 
impact to the operator, time is evaluated. An example would be a GPS failure due to 
environmental effects which resolves by flying the aircraft away from the degraded region within 
an acceptable time based on operational conditions. Category III events can elevate to category II 
or I events if left unmitigated. For purposes of this analysis category I failure prevention is 
focused on first, followed by categories II and III.  
Fault tree diagrams for each critical function are located in Appendix A. Probabilities for 
specified failures within components are set to 0 as a placeholder since data exist for only 
component failures and not specified events. Table 4 through Table 20, display the fault tree 
diagrams in table form. The tables display the criticality of the failure, the failure, and if the 
failure is a checklist item. An X mark in the checklist item column indicates a majority of the 
system risk can be mitigated by a low time commitment inspection or test. A / mark means a 
larger time commitment is required to mitigate risk. For example, in the Generate Lift Fault Tree 
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Table, Table 4, the poor attachment failure, attributed to the motor component, can be mitigated 
by a physical inspection of the motor attachment before flight, denoted by an X. The large 
propeller failure, attributed to the motor component, requires detailed motor propeller testing to 
reveal any overheating issues that may arise, denoted by a /. This test requires a longer time 
commitment and analysis opposed to simply checking a motor attachment.  
The generate lift fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 4. 
Generating lift requires nominal performance from motors, propellers, ESCs, and the flight 
computer. Design redundancy in motors, propellers, and ESCs can reduce the criticality of a 
component failure from I to II. A design implementation of this redundancy is a hexarotor or 6 
motor system. This design can tolerate a failure in up to two motors, ESCs, and/or propellers and 
still achieve flight, albeit degraded. Conversely, a quad rotor system can only perform flight with 
all motors, ESCs, and propellers functioning nominally.  
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Table 4. Flight: Generate Lift Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Failure Level 2 Checklist Item  
I: if Four motors or 
less else II Motor Failure  
Faulty Wiring     X 
Manufacturing Defect      
Poor Attachment    X 
Overheating  
Large Propeller  / 
Frame Vibrations / 
Poor Center of Gravity  / 
Long Mounting Screws X 
Level X 
Environment / 
Life Span   / 
Failed Bearing    / 
Infant Mortality    / 
I: if Four motors or 
less else II ESC Failure 
Surge of Current      
Manufacturing Defect   / 
Infant Mortality      
I: if Four motors or 
less else II 
Propeller Failure 
Contact with Equipment    X 
Improper Mounting    X 
Damage from Contact   X 
I Flight Computer Failure  
Infant Mortality      
Manufacturing Defect    / 
Life Span   / 
Environment    / 
Surge of Current      
 
The provide stability fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 5. 
Frame failure is a criticality value of I, as any large change in frame structural support will 
induce flight failure. A propeller component failure in the form of a wrong propeller direction is 
a criticality of III, since the air vehicle will not takeoff and requires little time to fix. All other 
component failure modes can range in criticality from I-III. The level of criticality is largely 
dependent on the operator’s familiarity with the system, the ability to recognize irregularities, 
and the level of the error. An example of this is a center of gravity imbalance, if the air vehicle 
takeoffs, an experience operator will recognize and issue and land the air vehicle immediately. 
Although if the level of center of gravity issue is high or the operator in inexperienced, the air 
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vehicle will take off and immediately crash. Many of these issues can be mitigated by pre-flight 
checklists.  
Table 5. Flight: Provide Stability Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Frame Failure 
Over Flexibility X 
Crack Propagation / 
Loose Fasteners X 
I-III  Center of Gravity 
Baseline X 
Payload Modularity X 
Frame Level X 
Shift in Flight    
III Propeller Wrong Prop Direction X 
I-III  Motor Mount Poor Mounting  X 
I-III  Flight Computer Poor Gain Tuning  / 
I-III  ESC Wrong Mode X 
I-III  Payload Excess Weight X 
I-III  N/A Environment  / 
 
The launch fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 6. Operator 
failures within the table benefit from a well-trained operator on the representative system and a 
checklist. Training combined with pre-flight checklists enables the operator to identify 
irregularities in the system and component, preventing criticality level I failures. Environmental 
effects and assembly errors can be mitigated by checklists and training but require operator 
experience. Component level errors and auto takeoff are attributed to failures within components 
and software.  
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Table 6. Flight: Launch Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I-III Operator  
Error in 
Assembly  / 
Collision   
Setup X 
Flight Error   
I-III Various  Component Error   
I-III Flight Computer 
Auto Takeoff 
Error   
I-III N/A  Environment  / 
 
The recover and reuse fault tree table, part of the flight functionality, is shown in Table 7. 
The criticality of failures are all level I since the if they occur the mission is ended, as the aircraft 
is no longer airborne and/or is unable to be reused. These failures are acceptable if the operator 
has completed the mission to satisfaction, or if the mission requires termination due to a threat. 
Emphasis in recover and reuse is the prevention of betrayal. The system shall not reveal the 
operator’s location or provide intelligence to an adversary.    
Table 7. Flight: Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Various: Destructive Crash  
Battery Depletion X 
Collision   
Ditch  / 
Environment    
I Operator Operational Decision   Ground Effects / 
I Frame  Frame Failure / 
I Flight Computer Flight Comp Failure / 
I Sensor Sensor Failure / 
I Landing Gear Landing Gear Failure / 
I  Various No Spares / 
 
The pack and store fault tree table, part of the transport functionality, is shown in Table 8. 
Transporting the SUAS at an appropriate weight to the field is critical to use the system. 
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Damaged components due to transport can be replaced in most cases with a dedicated spares kit 
but in extreme conditions the vehicle may be unrepairable. System design should allocate weight 
and space for required spares, if possible. The SUAS should be packaged in a manner that allows 
for deployment in a timely manner based on mission, preventing system betrayal to the user.  
Table 8. Transport: Pack and Store Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Rucksack/SUAS 
Unable to 
Breakdown X 
Unable to Configure X 
Excess Weight  X 
I-III Various  Damaged Components   
II Various  Fail to Deploy in Time X 
I-III Various  Damaged Support Equipment   
II Various  Inability for Spares X 
 
The monitor fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 9. 
Monitoring the battery information is a critical piece of information for the operator in 
determining mission duration. Dependent on system architecture, the battery information can be 
collected by the sensor and/or flight computer. This information is then passed through 
transmitters on the SUAS to the receiver on the GCS for the user to view. Monitoring the battery 
levels is level II criticality since the mission can continue at a degraded state without the 
information. In this case more risk is placed on operator awareness to know the endurance 
limitations of the system.  
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Table 9. Power: Monitor Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
II: If redundant or 
failsafes 
Transmitter/ 
Receiver 
Out of Range / 
Signal Noise   
Wrong pairing  X 
Faulty  / 
II: If redundant or 
failsafes Flight Computer 
Faulty Wiring  / 
Bad Data    
Incorrect Wiring  / 
II: If redundant or 
failsafes Sensor  
Faulty Wiring  / 
Bad Data    
Incorrect Wiring  / 
I Battery Depleted  / 
 
The distribute fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 10. The 
SUAS must provide power to enable critical functions. If the battery is depleted the mission will 
end, and in most cases will induce a fatal crash of the SUAS. A wiring and circuit fault can range 
in criticality. This criticality is dependent on the operator recognizing the issue and mitigating it 
as soon as possible. Pre-flight checklists are focused at mitigating these two failures while the 
vehicle is on the ground before flight. Once airborne, these failures are more likely to induce 
level I or II criticality.  
Table 10. Power: Distribute Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Battery Depleted X 
I-III Wiring 
Faulty   
Incorrect Wiring  / 
Disconnected 
Wire X 
Cut Wire / 
I-III Circuits 
BEC Failure / 
ESC Failure / 
PDU Failure / 
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The regulate fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 11. 
Critical components must receive the correct voltage and current from the power supply to 
perform their functions. Redundancy for BEC and ESCs can mitigate the criticality of the failure 
but at the cost of system weight and complexity. In turn, to maximize endurance, BEC and ESC 
are usually single points of failure resulting in motor, flight computer, or sensor issues. Battery 
and grounding component failures will cause an unrecoverable system failure.   
Table 11. Power: Regulate Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
III: if redundant 
else I BEC/ESC 
Bad Soldering / 
Burst Current   
High Current X 
Infant Mortality   
Manufacture 
Error   
I Battery  Depletion  / 
I Various  Grounding Issue X 
 
The store fault tree table, part of the power functionality, is shown in Table 12. Storing 
power is performed by a battery attached to the vehicle’s frame. If the air vehicle is unable to 
store power the mission will end. Increased risks for lithium polymer battery failure include 
punctured battery, depletion past 80% life, overcharge/undercharge, to many charge cycles, and 
poor wiring connection. The operator must pay attention to securing the battery to the frame via 
storage bay, Velcro, fasteners, etc. All failures can be mitigated by checklist items.  
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Table 12. Power: Store Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Battery 
Depleted / 
Punctured / 
Overcharge X 
End of Life X 
Poor Connection X 
Undercharge X 
I Battery + Frame Unsecure X 
 
The observe environment fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown 
in Table 13. The SUAS must observe the environment to satisfy the ISR mission. Any fault that 
prohibits the sensor on the SUAS from working eliminates the usefulness for the operator. These 
failures can be attributed to the sensor itself, power to the sensor, the environment, or the 
configuration of the sensor. A sensor gimbal allows the operator to independently control the 
camera from the air vehicle. If the gimbal fails, the sensor will still can observe the environment 
but requires the air vehicle to get in the correct position.  
Table 13. Surveillance: Observe Environment Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Sensor Defect 
Infant Mortality   
Manufacture Defect   
Wiring  / 
I Sensor Environment  
Lens Fog   
Wrong Sensor X 
Altitude   
Poor Look Angle   
Interference / 
I Sensor Configuration 
Lens Focus  / 
Data Rate / 
Obstructed View X 
II Gimbal  
BEC Failure / 
Servo Failure / 
Lock / 
Wiring Issue  / 
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The transmit and receive fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown 
in Table 14. To give the operator an enhanced visual perspective the imagery must be transmitted 
from onboard sensor to the GCS. Transmitter and receiver errors occur when there is information 
being transferred, the air vehicle is out of range, or there are component level failures. The 
antennas must be paired correctly together at the same frequency and place in correct orientation. 
Body masking from the air vehicle and the environment can impact the antenna and the quality 
of transmission. If the sensor architecture is dependent on a BEC for a stepdown of voltage, then 
it must perform to allow transmission. The operator must ensure the sensor is properly connected 
to the transmitter or output source.  
Table 14. Surveillance: Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I Transmitter / Receiver 
Out of Range / 
Transmit Error   
Low Bandwidth  / 
Receive Error   
II/III Antenna  
Masking / 
Wrong Antenna X 
Broken Antenna / 
I BEC BEC Failure / 
II/III Sensor Config Poor Connection / 
I GCS Power Issue / 
II/III N/A Interference / 
 
The human interface fault tree table, part of the surveillance functionality, is shown in 
Table 15. For surveillance to be successful the operator must be able to receive the sensor feed 
from the SUAS; this is done through the GCS. The GCS can fail by either hardware or software 
issues. In most cases a software issue will only degrade functionality of this system, assuming all 
pre-deployment checklist items are completed. While hardware failures like loss of power, 
broken screen, or weather damage will render surveillance capability inoperable. Training is 
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important to the human interface function, since wrong inputs to the GCS can reduce the 
functionality of the system. Training time and functionality should be balanced with GCS 
complexity to ensure the system is simple enough to perform required tasks but also robust 
enough to allow for operator decision making.   
Table 15. Surveillance: Human Interface Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
II Software GCS 
No User Input X 
Bad Update X 
Glitch   
I Hardware GCS 
No Power X 
Broken Screen X 
Weather Damage / 
II Operator  
Improper 
Command   
Complexity  X 
 
The sensor control fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 16. 
Control of the sensor is important to detect and track items of interest from the SUAS. The 
gimbal controls and stabilizes movement of the sensor independent of the air vehicle. A gimbal 
failure degrades functionality and places more stress on the operator to maneuver the air vehicle 
to capture the desired information. Transmission of control is done through the GCS. If a failure 
occurs the air vehicle can still be positioned via remote control to capture information. The 
sensor and its components must be in working condition for successful control. If the lens is 
fogged or improperly connected, no level of control will mitigate this failure. In addition, the 
sensor and its power must be functioning properly for control the be effective. Pre-flight 
checklist largely mitigates these potential failures. 
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Table 16. Control: Sensor Control Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
II Gimbal 
BEC Failure / 
Lock / 
Wiring Issue / 
Transmit/Receive / 
Servo Failure / 
II GCS 
Software Issue / 
Hardware Issue / 
Transmit/Receive / 
Operator Issue / 
Processing Issue / 
I-III Lens 
Poor Lens 
Connection X 
Lens Fog / 
I Power/Battery GCS Power Failure / Payload Power / 
I Sensor 
Poor Connection  X 
Infant Mortality   
Manufacture Defect   
 
The flight control fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 17. 
This fault tree table assumes there are two control nodes within the SUAS system. The first node 
is the remote-control node consisting of a transmitter, controlled by the operator, and a receiver 
on the air vehicle. The second node is the autopilot node consisting of a transmitter, controlled 
by the GCS, and a receiver on the air vehicle. In this configuration one node can fail and system 
performance is only degraded. For example, if the autopilot fails, the operator now must control 
the air vehicle manually without preprogramed commands. This degrades the operator’s 
situational awareness and puts them at a higher level of risk. The hub of all control on the air 
vehicle is the flight computer. It processes commands from both the remote control and GCS. If 
the flight computer fails, the system is no longer controlled, and a failsafe will be activated. 
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Table 17. Control: Flight Control Fault Tree Table 
Criticality Component Failure Level 1 Failure Level 2 Checklist Item 
II: If system has 
both autopilot 
and RC else I 
Remote Control 
Components 
Transmitter 
Frequency  X 
Antenna Position  / 
Depleted Power / 
Wrong Input   
Low Signal  / 
Software Issue / 
Manufacture Defect    
Receiver 
Antenna Issue / 
Payload Interaction  X 
Wiring Issue / 
Range / 
Manufacture Defect    
Not Paired  X 
II: If system has 
both autopilot 
and RC else I 
Autopilot Components 
Transmitter 
Manufacture Defect    
Orientation Issue / 
Poor Link w/GCS / 
Poor Pair 
w/Receiver X 
Wiring Issue / 
Receiver 
Antenna Issue / 
Range / 
Wiring Issue / 
Manufacture Defect    
Payload Interaction  X 
I for all except 
gain tuning II Flight Computer 
Software Issue   / 
Motor Wiring    / 
Infant Mortality      
Gain tuning    / 
Excess 
Vibrations   / 
 
The failsafe fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 18. 
Failsafes are operator programmed flight modes that activate when link is lost between the GCS 
and/or the remote control. Flight modes include but are not limited to return to base, hover, self-
destruct, or land. A failure of a failsafe is defined as the air vehicle performing a flight mode that 
is unexpected or not commanded. This can occur by incorrect programming of failsafes by the 
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operator including the wrong return to base location, wrong failsafe, or unprogrammed failsafe. 
Additionally, the air vehicle may be unable to complete the command due to an object within its 
path or a recovery issue. Finally, the flight computer may think there is a failsafe command when 
there is not, type I error or the flight computer does not perform a failsafe when it is commanded, 
type II error. 
Table 18. Control: Failsafe Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
I-III Operator/GCS  
Unprogrammed X 
Wrong Failsafe X 
Wrong RTB X 
I or III Air Vehicle 
Object in Failsafe 
path / 
Hard Landing    
I or II Flight Computer 
Type I Error   
Type II Error   
 
The guidance fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 19. 
Guidance is required for the autopilot to function correctly. With a dual control mode in the 
system architecture a guidance failure only degrades the performance of the SUAS, since the air 
vehicle can still be controlled by the remote control. The GPS enables positioning for the air 
vehicle and provides location information via the GCS to the operator. GPS can be degraded by 
conditions including a GPS denial environment, urban canyons, power lines, or large metal 
objects. The air vehicle can also mask the GPS signal depending on the frequency and power of 
signals emanating from the platform, placement of antennas, and electromagnetic interference 
from the selected sensor or components. The Initial Flight checklist is focused on mitigating 
these failures.  
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Table 19. Control: Guidance Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Checklist Item  
II GPS 
Environment 
Masking  / 
Poor Connection X 
Manufacturing 
Defect   
II Transmitter/ Receiver Range / 
II Air Vehicle Frame Masking X 
II Sensor Jamming GPS X 
 
The provide status fault tree table, part of the control functionality, is shown in Table 20. 
The flight computer provides flight information to the GCS including altitude, speed, flight 
mode, heading, pitch, GPS, signal strength. These data categories are important to monitor the 
performance of the air vehicle for mission execution and irregularities. The air vehicle can still 
perform without this information but at a higher burden on the operator to identify performance 
issues. Issues can arise from the GCS software of hardware, flight computer, or operator error 
with the GCS interface. 
Table 20. Control: Provide Status Fault Tree Table 
Criticality  Component  Failure Level 1  Failure Level 2 Checklist Item  
II GCS Display 
Broken Screen  X 
Power X 
Hidden Data / 
Software Issue   / 
II Flight Computer 
Wiring Telemetry Issue   / 
No GPS Data   / 
Transmitter/Receiver 
Issue   / 
II Operator Data not Configured   X Obscured Data   / 
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Reliability Analysis  
 
Figure 18. Critical Components and Reliability Analysis Process 
 
Probability of failure for SUAS components were researched. Limited information exists 
on failures of critical SUAS components due to rapid advancement of components, diversity of 
components, and relatively low costs. Components that induce Category I event failure include 
motors, propellers, flight computer, ESC, BEC, transmitter, receiver, sensor, battery, frame, and 
GCS. Table 21 provides a summary of failure rates for these components that were researched 
and documented from online sources.  
Failure rates are in failures per hour and are grouped based on components. Average 
failure rates are displayed for common component categories. For example, the average failure 
rate from the data collected for flight computers is 4.46 ∗ 10ିଷ  failures per hour. All like 
component failure rates are used for average failure, except the receiver system which is in bold 
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text under the part column. This failure rate of 0.37 failures/hr was excluded since the failure 
would be observed on a majority of missions, therefore is not an acceptable part and would be 
replaced with a more reliable system. 
 Failures for components are assumed to be past the infant mortality phase and occur 
within the constant failure rate zone of the bathtub curve. At a constant failure rate, the 
components are in normal life of the bathtub curve and have had burn-in performed to remove 
early life errors. Figure 19 shows the bathtub curve for electronics.  These failure rates can be 
applied to a representative multirotor system for a system level reliability and mean time to 
failure. This is performed in the System Design section of the SUAS product process.  
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Table 21. Failure Rates for Category I Components 
Part  
Failure 
rate/hr Average Condition  Comment Source  
Flight Computer 1.50E-02 4.46E-03 Field 
Pixhawk 1-quote 
from 3DR Chris 
Anderson 
(Thompson & Anderson, 
2016) 
Flight Computer 1.57E-03   Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
Flight Computer 1.25E-04   Research 
Based on sub 
components: Gyro 
Accel and filter, low 
reliability 
(Pashchuk, Salnyk, & 
Volochiy, 2017) 
Flight Computer 4.94E-05   Research 
Based on sub 
components: Gyro 
Accel and filter, high 
reliability (Pashchuk et al., 2017) 
Flight Computer 1.00E-02   Research Common electronics 
(Breunig et al., n.d.; 
Stockwell & Schulman, 
2016) 
Flight Computer 2.00E-05   Lab   (O’Reilly, 2017) 
Motor 1.00E-04 1.59E-03 Lab After infant mortality (O’Reilly, 2017) 
Motor 1.00E-04   Lab   
(“Phantom 1 MTBF,” 
2016) 
Motor  5.00E-03   Observed 
Crowd source data 
collect (Moore, 2018) 
Motor 2.20E-03   Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
Motor 5.56E-04   Research   
(Wang, Mao, & Wei, 
2018) 
Propeller 8.33E-04 1.81E-02 Research   (Wang et al., 2018) 
Propeller 3.40E-03   Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
Propeller 5.00E-02   SME FOD Contact (Kevorkian, 2016) 
Rotor 
(motor+prop) 4.00E-02   Research 
Combined Motor and 
Propeller subsystem 
(Aslansefat, Marques, 
Mendonça, & Barata, 
2017) 
Frame 5.00E-04 1.57E-03 Research   (Wang et al., 2018) 
Frame 2.07E-04   Research   
(Abdallah, Kouta, Sarraf, 
Gaber, & Wack, 2018) 
Frame 4.00E-03   SME Crack Propagation (Kevorkian, 2016) 
Batteries 2.00E-05 4.77E-03 Lab   (O’Reilly, 2017) 
Batteries 1.40E-03   Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
Batteries 5.00E-04   Research   (Wang et al., 2018) 
Batteries 8.76E-06   Research   (Abdallah et al., 2018) 
Batteries 1.00E-02   SME   (Kevorkian, 2016) 
ESC 2.00E-04 1.26E-02 Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
ESC 2.50E-02   SME   (Kevorkian, 2016) 
BEC 1.10E-03 1.77E-03 Research   (Reimann et al., 2013) 
BEC 6.67E-04   Research   (Wang et al., 2018) 
Receiver 2.60E-03 1.16E-03 Research 
Entire radio system, 
outlier (Reimann et al., 2013) 
Receiver 7.14E-04   Research   (Wang et al., 2018) 
Receiver 1.53E-04   Research 
With interference 
from NPRD-2016 (Abdallah et al., 2018) 
Receiver 
System 3.70E-01   SME 
Entire radio system, 
outlier (Kevorkian, 2016) 
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Part  
Failure 
rate/hr Average Condition  Comment Source  
Blackfly S 
Camera 6.32E-07 1.03E-05 
Mobile 
environme
nt  5 hr Burn In @50C 
(“Blackfly S Color 1.3 MP 
USB3 Vision (ON Semi 
PYTHON 1300),” 2018) 
Camera 2.00E-05   Lab   (O’Reilly, 2017) 
GCS 8.55E-04 1.93E-03 
Representa
tive 
Environme
nt  
1 yr life at 4 missions 
a week at 1.5 hr 
missions, 2.4% 
Failure per year, 
Panasonic 
Toughbook (Panasonic, 2009) 
GCS 3.00E-03   
Representa
tive 
Environme
nt  
1 yr life at 14 
missions a week at 
1.5 hr missions, 2.4% 
Failure per year, 
Panasonic 
Toughbook (Panasonic, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 19. Bathtub Failure Rates for Electronics (Wilkins, 2002) 
 With failure rates and categories of failures defined, a hazard/reliability matrix can be 
defined to show the impact to the overall system if a specific component fails. The matrix takes 
the failure rate for a given component and the category/impact of failure and then defines the 
level of risk to the system. Risk focus areas are mitigating components that induce high and 
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medium-high risk areas. Figure 20 shows the hazard/reliability Matrix with operational 
definitions for categories, failure rates, and risks. Figure 21, then places the category I 
components into the matrix aligned with average researched failure rates.  
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Figure 20. Hazard/Reliability Matrix 
 
Figure 21. Hazard/Reliability Matrix with Critical Parts 
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Generate Checklists 
 
Figure 22. Generate Operator Checklist Process 
 
  Four checklists are generated from inputs from the fault tree diagrams and identification 
of critical components. Checklist are designed to mitigate risks to the system before operational 
flights. Each checklist rule is attributed to SUAS component and category. Additionally, benefits 
to each checklist rule are listed that detail which failures are mitigated. The first checklist is the 
pre-flight checklist, meant to be performed before each mission. This checklist is designed to be 
a low time commitment inspection that the operator can perform, mitigating X checklist items 
generated in the fault tree tables. Examples within this checklist include visual inspection of 
components for damage, securing of fasteners and components, center of gravity, proper wiring, 
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and propeller clearance. The pre-flight checklist, shown in Table 22, should be performed on 
scene and once the SUAS is assembled to ensure failures were not induced from transportation.  
 
Table 22. Pre-Flight Checklist 
Component Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Motor Attachment 
Ensure motors are properly attached to 
frame, secure all fasteners. Ensure fasteners 
are not touching motor coils. 
Prevents motor detachment 
and overheating in flight 
and ensures stable flight 
Motor Wiring  
Ensure motor are wired properly, connected 
to ESCs and flight computer. Ensure wires 
are secured and in good condition.  
Prevents motor power 
failure in flight 
Motor Leveling  Ensure motors are level to frame.  
Prevents overheating, 
enables stable flight 
Motor Defect Check 
Ensure motor spins freely without 
resistance. Listen for any rubbing. Inspect 
coils and magnets for any damage.  
Motor is properly 
functioning for stable flight 
Propeller Attachment 
Ensure propellers are properly attached to 
motors and have the correct direction of 
rotation. 
Prevents propeller 
detachment and ensure 
stable flight 
Propeller  Defect Check 
Ensure there are no defects in the 
propellers, minor nicks are ok. Inspect for 
delamination and cracks.  
Prevent propeller failure in 
flight 
Propeller Size  
Ensure propellers are the correct size for 
the motors.  
Prevents motor overheating 
and degraded flight 
Propeller  Contact 
Ensure all propellers are clear of wires and 
components. 1/4" clearance is desired for 
frame flex. Secure potential contact items. 
Prevents cut wires or 
destroyed components 
Frame  Stiffness/Secure  
Check for loose fasteners, loose arms, and 
overall frame stiffness. Place weight on the 
frame and listen for any creaking sounds to 
inspect for frame cracks. Tighten fasteners 
and components if required. 
Enables stable flight and 
reduces probability of 
induced crash 
Frame  Leveling  Ensure frame is level ground.  Promotes stable takeoff 
Frame  Landing Gear 
Ensure landing gear are stable and solid 
with required weight. If landing gear 
retracts, cycle through procedure to ensure 
functionality.  Prevents landing failure  
Wiring  Connections 
Ensure all wires are connected into flight 
computer and required components 
(motors, ESC, battery, payload). Check for 
any improper wiring. Check battery 
connection polarity.  
Ensures communication 
and power are distributed 
across vehicle safely.  
ESC Defect Check 
Check ESC for loose soldering or poor 
connections.  
Prevents ESC and flight 
failure  
Battery  Charge 
Ensure battery is the correct cell count, 
capacity, and is fully charged.  
Prevents shortened 
endurance and flight 
failures 
Battery  Damage 
Ensure battery is free from punctures or 
frayed connections.  
Prevents in flight battery 
failure 
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Component Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Battery  Secure 
Ensure battery is secure to the frame and 
wires are free from contact. 
Prevents CG shift in flight 
or loss of battery 
Frame  Center of Gravity 
Hold the air frame along rotation axis and 
ensure aircraft is balanced. If unbalance 
shift battery, payload, or components.  
Promotes stable flight and 
maximum endurance 
Payload/Sensor Secure 
Ensure sensor and components (lens) are 
properly connected to frame. Field of view 
of payload should not be blocked by frame. 
Cabling should be plugged in a secure.  
Enables proper 
functionality of sensor for 
mission 
Payload/Sensor Lens 
Ensure lens is connected to camera and is 
not cracked or fogged.  
Enables proper 
functionality of sensor for 
mission 
Flight Computer  Defect Check 
Ensure proper power supply from battery, 
secure to frame, and secure cabling.   
Proper functionality for 
mission 
Receiver Antenna  
Ensure antenna is correct for receiver is 
clear of propeller and plugged in before 
powering. If dual antennas position one in 
horizontal frame and one in vertical frame.  
Proper placement ensures 
maximum control range 
BEC Defect Check 
Check incoming cabling for defects and 
inspect BEC for any damage. 
Promotes proper voltage 
for all critical components 
Environment  Envelope 
Ensure the current and forecasted weather 
is within the performance envelope for the 
configured air vehicle. Document wind 
speed, gust speed, precipitation, 
temperature, and humidity levels. 
Promotes expected flight 
performance. Provides data 
for environmental impacts 
for flight analysis 
Environment  Flight Path 
Evaluate surroundings for planned flight 
path. Check for obstacles within path. 
Identify power lines, metal buildings, or 
large objects which can interfere with 
signals.  
Mitigates command and 
control loss 
 
Next is the pre-deployment checklist, this checklist occurs before deployment to the 
mission location due to the larger time commitment. The pre-deployment checklist is shown in 
Table 23. The checklist ensures the SUAS is performing its designed functionality while on the 
ground in a stable environment allowing for simplified troubleshooting from the operator. The 
checklist provides possible failure modes for unsuccessful checks for operator troubleshooting. 
Examples within the checklist include initial component check, range check, flight computer 
calibration, system power check, and GCS mode check.  
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Table 23. Pre-Deployment Checklists 
Component Category Checklist Rules Possible Failures Benefits 
Multiple 
Initial Function 
Check 
Plug in all batteries to 
the aircraft. Ensure no 
smoking wires, burning 
smells, or odd noises. If 
these exist immediately 
unplug and troubleshoot.  
Wiring issue, wrong 
batteries, damaged battery, 
depleted battery, poor 
grounding.  
Confirms 
correct wiring 
and power to 
subsystems 
RC Transmitter Distance check  
Ensure the RC receiver 
on the aircraft receives 
command from the 
transmitter at minimum 
of 100 yards on the 
ground.  
Sensor jamming RC 
controls, wrong 
receiver/transmitter pair, 
low transmitter battery, 
damage receiver/transmitter, 
receiver masking, 
environmental effects, poor 
wiring 
Prevents signal 
loss in the air  
GPS  Lock 
Ensure GPS has satellite 
lock for more than 30 
seconds and is stable. 
Check for Satellite count 
(min 6) and HDOP 
values (1-2 m standard). 
Sensor jamming, poor 
wiring, bad GPS unit, 
environmental effect, no 
power, faulty flight 
computer, GPS masking 
Establishes 
GPS 
connection and 
established no 
interference 
w/payload 
Flight Computer  
IMU/compass 
calibration 
Calibrate IMU/compass 
within flight computer.  
Software issue, poor user 
calibration 
Correct 
calibration for 
flight. 
RC 
Transmitter/GCS Mode Check  
Toggle flight modes on 
flight computer and 
confirm modes on GCS 
software i.e. position 
hold, altitude hold etc. 
Flight computer issue, 
software issue, transmitter 
issue 
Establishes 
correct flight 
controls for the 
RC system  
Sensor Function check  
Establish connection 
with sensor and ensure 
data is being transferred 
to GCS. Evaluate quality 
of data and any changes 
required to sensor. 
Poor GCS/sensor power, 
poor connection with GCS 
(software, transmitter), poor 
sensor connection, low 
bandwidth, too high of data 
rate from sensor, lens issue, 
poor antenna position. 
Confirms good 
data flow from 
sensor  
Sensor Frequency Test 
Power up sensor, 
transmitter, and receiver 
to transmit video. Ensure 
air vehicle is a short 
distance from GCS. 
Cover transmitter and 
receiver antenna and 
ensure no degradation in 
video. 
Wrong frequency pairing 
between transmitter and 
receiver.  
Ensure proper 
video feed  
Sensor Movement 
Command movement of 
the sensor through GCS 
ensure functionality and 
confirm data.  
Gimbal issue, power issue, 
GCS issue, wiring issue 
Confirms 
performance of 
sensor and 
gimbal  
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Component Category Checklist Rules Possible Failures Benefits 
Motor Function check  
Ensure the correct motor 
is commanded from 
flight computer. Listen 
for odd sounds or 
movement.  
Motor defect, wiring issue, 
failed ESC, wrong ESC 
mode, wrong propeller 
direction or attachment, 
poor motor attachment 
Confirms 
motors are 
functioning 
correctly for 
stable flight   
Propeller Balancing 
Ensure each propeller 
and backups are 
balanced using a 
propeller balancer 
(standard propellers) or a 
scale (foldable 
propellers). 
Manufacturing defect, 
damaged propeller 
Prevents 
unstable flight  
GCS Function check  
Ensure video, battery 
data, GPS, and flight 
data are displayed on 
GCS. Ensure GCS 
receives information at 
100-yard range. 
Hardware issue, software 
issue, transmit issue, power 
issue, setting issue 
Confirms all 
data is 
provided to 
operator 
Battery Power Check 
Ensure batteries are fully 
charged, establish cut off 
voltage for flight. Test 
with voltage monitor or 
GCS. 3-3.2 V/cell is 
minimum cut of voltage. 
Batteries not fully charged, 
charger issue, wrong battery 
Confirms full 
endurance 
flight 
capability 
GCS Gain Tuning  
Ensure gain tunnning is 
correct for selected 
configuration or set at 
established defaults. 
Software update/reset, 
configuration control  
Promotes 
stable flight for 
selected 
payloads 
ESC Configuration 
Confirm the correct 
configuration for the 
ESC for flight profile. 
Calibrate ESCs.  
Mode changed by user, 
configuration change, 
software update 
Promotes 
stable flight  
Multiple Spares 
Confirm all required 
spares are packaged, 
configured, and in 
working condition.   
Mitigates 
component 
failures 
 
The largest time commitment checklist is the initial flight checklist, shown in Table 24. 
This checklist focusses on performing required functions while the SUAS is airborne in a 
controlled manner. The initial flight checklist allows a stable environment for performance issues 
to be revealed and mitigated. If possible, the checklist should be performed by the operator with 
the aid of the system developer, allowing the operator to gain experience with the handling and 
control of SUAS. Tests include a range test, flight control mode, gain tuning, sensor transmit, 
takeoff and landing. The initial flight checklist should be performed when any aircraft 
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modification is made to the system including new motors, new sensors, shift in center of gravity, 
etc. Even if system is in a baseline configuration there should be an established schedule to 
perform the checklist based on flight hours. This ensures the SUAS is still performing as 
expected and rules out induced errors from the operational environment, transport, or operator 
handling. This checklist also includes a possible failure column for operator troubleshooting. 
 
Table 24. Initial Flight Checklists 
Component Category Checklist Rules Possible Failures Benefits 
Multiple Cyber Vulnerability  
Ensure data transmitted 
including imagery, 
telemetry, and command is 
secure. Use close networks 
and secured networks if 
possible. Implement 
failsafes if data has been 
compromised. 
Loss of data from 
cyber breach put 
special operators at 
risk. 
Prevents data loss 
and ensures 
mission data is 
secure.  
Multiple Takeoff 
Slowly spin up motors for 
takeoff, listen for any 
irregularities. Ensure the air 
vehicle is not directly 
overhead of anyone. Place 
aircraft in hover position 
were the operator can 
visually see and note 
performance of the air 
vehicle.  
Center of gravity, 
motors un-leveled, 
propeller contact, 
excess weight, 
depleted battery, motor 
failure 
Detect poor 
performance 
before airborne or 
on mission. 
Ensure safety of 
participants and 
perform flight 
inspection.  
Multiple  Manual Hover 
Place the air vehicle into 
hover via RC control, 
document any drifting, 
cyclical, or vibrating 
behavior.  Document 
throttle percentage at hover, 
hover should be at 50% 
throttle or less.  
Gain tuning 
unbalanced in 
GCS/flight computer, 
environment impacts, 
center of gravity issue, 
motor/prop issue 
Allows stable 
position to 
evaluate control 
issues. Land air 
vehicle and make 
changes to gains.  
Multiple Mode Check  
While in hover place air 
vehicle into desired modes 
including altitude and 
position hold. Document 
any drifting, cyclical, or 
vibrating behavior. If the 
vehicle is making large in 
air adjustments, switch to 
RC and land immediately.  
Gain tuning 
unbalanced in 
GCS/flight computer, 
environment impacts, 
center of gravity issue, 
motor/prop issue, GPS 
issue  
Allows stable 
position to 
evaluate control 
issues. Land air 
vehicle and make 
changes to gains.  
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Component Category Checklist Rules Possible Failures Benefits 
Transmitter/ 
Receiver Range Check  
Place air vehicle at desired 
operating altitude and move 
vehicle away from 
transmitter gradually. 
Document signal strength 
for both RC and GCS.  
On board EMI, body 
masking, antenna 
issue, environmental 
masking, power issue, 
software issue  
Establishes 
approximate 
flight range 
RC Responsiveness 
Control the air vehicle 
manually and ensure all 
input movement is correct 
i.e. yaw input controls, etc. 
Operator should perform 
desired and required 
movement to achieve 
comfort with the system and 
document any limitations 
and alter gain tuning for 
desired improvements. 
Gain tuning 
unbalanced, excess 
weight, low battery, 
software issue, 
improper wiring, 
center of gravity issue 
Establishes 
correct flight 
controls for the 
operator 
GCS/ Flight 
Computer Mission Follow 
Plan a mission within the 
GCS and transmit to air 
vehicle, include loiter 
points. Document air 
vehicle performance and 
any deviations from the 
mission. Document GPS 
performance and 
transmitter/receiver 
strength.  
GPS issue, 
environment, range, 
transmitter/receiver 
issue, software issue 
Confirms desired 
mission 
performance 
Sensor Performance  
Confirm sensor 
performance while in flight, 
ensure data is transferred to 
GCS. Check focus levels at 
representative altitude, data 
bandwidth, and frames per 
second.  
Lens issue, 
environment, 
transmit/receive issue, 
software issue, GCS 
issue 
Confirms sensor 
performance is 
appropriate for 
mission 
Gimbal Performance  
Operator induces sensor 
movement for a desired 
target point. Document 
performance issues: target 
out of view, gimbal lock, 
transition time, etc. 
Servo issue, 
transmit/receive issue, 
flight computer issue, 
software issue, BEC 
issue, environment 
Confirms gimbal 
performance is 
appropriate for 
mission  
Software Performance  
Operator sends required 
tracking commands or 
target detect commands for 
the sensor. Operator ensures 
the air vehicle follows 
commands and provides 
feedback to GCS. 
GCS configuration, 
software update, 
hardware issue, sensor 
issue, lens issue, 
environment 
Ensures software 
and human 
interface is 
functioning for 
mission 
Multiple Landing 
Safely land the air vehicle 
via RC. Evaluate for any 
propeller wash, hard 
landing, and stability.  
Propeller wash, high 
weight, configuration 
issue, center of gravity  
Confirms air 
vehicle can 
handle load and 
land safely 
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Component Category Checklist Rules Possible Failures Benefits 
Multiple Configuration 
Document time required to 
unpack, assemble, and 
deploy air vehicle. Then 
document time to store 
vehicle for transit.  
Broken components, 
missing parts, missing 
tools, frame stiffness 
issue 
Representative 
time for mission 
deployment 
established  
 
The final checklist is a spare checklist. This checklist details the required spare 
components for the operator to pack to mitigate critical component failures. Spares should be 
pre-configured for ease of integration into the system. For example, the spare flight computer has 
the same gain tuning parameters as the onboard flight computer, motors have burn-in test 
complete with representative propellers, transmitters and receivers are paired, etc. The spare list 
is focused on replacement parts for components which induce category I events if they fail. 
Spares should always be packed with the system if room and weight exist in the pack. The spare 
checklist is shown in Table 25.   
 
Table 25. Spares Checklist 
Component  Number of Spares Notes 
Propeller 1 for each motor  if quad 4, if hex 6 
Motor 1 min, 2 desired  
Burn in completed and preconfigured for assembly. 
Correct connections.  
Flight Computer 1 fully configured  Correct flight parameters and required cabling 
GPS 1 Complete with wiring harness 
ESC 2 Correctly configured, initial inspection completed 
BEC design dependent, min 1 Correct step-down voltage, complete with wiring  
Landing Gear Replacement 
Kit 1 desired Replacement material, connectors, and fasteners. 
Transmitter/ Receiver 
1 pair for RC, 1 pair for 
GCS, 1 for video Correct frequency and antennas with cabling  
Arm Replacement Kit 1 desired Replacement material, connectors, and fasteners. 
Backup sensor 
1 Fully configured for air vehicle integration and GCS integration. Does not have to be same as 
primary sensor.  
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Component  Number of Spares Notes 
Battery Main 1 min  Fully charged 
Battery GCS 1 min  Fully Charged 
Battery Connectors 1 min Correct connector type 
Battery Payload 1 min  Fully charged 
Tools 
Complete set  Required tools for tightening fasteners and assembling components, knife, wire strippers, vice 
grips, scissors 
Others kit  Velcro, tape, super glue, fasteners, zip ties 
 
System Design  
Define Physical Architecture  
 
Figure 23. Physical Architecture Process 
 
 The second section of the product development process is to define the physical 
architecture of the systems. It is important to take and balance inputs from the previous steps 
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focusing on initial design criteria, requirements, and mitigating reliability risks to the overall 
system. A designcChecklist was built from the author’s experience in the AFIT SUAS design 
sequence and online drone design forums. References for the online drone design forums are 
listed in Appendix B. These sources were utilized for not only design rules but the ISR SUAS 
design itself.  
The design checklist provides a ruleset with benefits, as physical architectures are built. 
The checklist starts at the system level providing input on multirotor type, material selection, 
frame size and then moves to rules for integrating components. Then integration of the 
appropriate motor and propeller combination based on frame type and weight is discussed. 
Design rules are established for motor size, weight, efficiency, power, torque, and KV value. 
Next, electronic components are discussed with and the importance of balancing a power budget 
for the SUAS. The power budget impacts battery selection including parameters of capacity, cell 
count, and discharge rating. With all components selected, weight budget is assimilated for 
endurance and packing weight calculations. The checklist is shown in Table 26.  
 
Table 26. Multirotor Design Checklist 
Component  Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Popular 
Brand/ Type 
Motor Number 
If packing requirement and 
endurance can be met, design for 
redundancy i.e. 6 motors. If not 
design for 4 motors.  
Increases overall 
system reliability and 
carry weight. 
T-motor, 
Multistar, 
KDE, Arris 
Sensors Type/size 
Consider sensors to perform mission, 
record weight, power requirements 
and designs impacts. Investigate the 
required components to transmit 
signals to the selected GCS interface.  
Meet sensor 
requirements, focus 
on trades for 
endurance, 
modularity, user 
interface, and power. 
FLIR, Go-
Pro, Sony, 
Runcam 
(FPV), 
Foxeer (FPV) 
Flight 
Computer  Type 
Select flight computers capable of 
autonomous and controlled flight. 
Investigate how electronic 
components interface with the 
computer and if the sensor requires 
Defines interfaces 
and helps establish 
wiring diagrams. 
Establishes power 
Pixhawk: 
1,2,4 (open 
source), 
Piccolo 
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Component  Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Popular 
Brand/ Type 
an interface. The flight computer 
should be centered in the frame 
design since it is the control hub.  
budget and control 
nodes.  
(closed 
Source),  
Frame  Type/size 
Choose an air frame which supports 
the number of motors selected and 
packing requirement. Frame must 
carry all required components and 
weight.  
Frame must fit the 
number of motors 
and projected design 
weight. 
Tarot, 
Foxtech, 
Matrix 
Frame  Material 
Select frame which has a high 
stiffness with capability to be 
packaged based on mission 
requirements. 
Higher stiffness 
mitigates control 
failure in flight. 
Material needs to 
fold multiple times 
for packing.  
Carbon Fiber, 
Aluminum  
Propeller  Size 
Determine propeller diameter based 
on frame size, ensure room on frame 
for payload. Maximize propeller size 
if possible. Consider thrust, motor 
efficiency, and heating. 
Mitigates propeller 
and component 
failure from strikes. 
KDE, T-
Motor, Tiger, 
Foxtech 
Propeller  Material 
Determine propeller material type 
and design which yields best 
performance for design. Material 
choices are carbon fiber or plastic.  
Design and material 
choice paired with 
motor type can yield 
increased efficiency.    
Propeller  Configuration 
Consider folding propellers and 
quick disconnect propellers, evaluate 
performance differences between 
traditional propellers. 
Increases packaging 
and decrease user set 
up time.    
Motor Sizing  
Determine motor size based on 
propeller size, consider the most 
important design factor for mission: 
Weight, Efficiency, Power, or 
Torque. These trades balance 
payload weight and endurance. 
Evaluate thrust test of motor with 
correct propeller size and reputation 
of motor brand. Seek out motor 
testing data with candidate 
propellers. 
Maximize endurance 
for a given design, 
select a reliable 
brand.  
T-motor, 
Multistar, 
KDE, Arris 
Motor Weight  
Lighter motors have a better 
response to input but are generally 
less reliable. Heavier motors pair 
well with larger propellers but have a 
slower response rate. 
Balance between 
weight trades for 
endurance and 
maximizing propeller 
size and thrust 
ratings.   
Motor Efficiency  
Choose a motor that is most efficient 
through the range of operations. 
Efficiency is measured in 
grams/Watt. Brushless motors are 
85-90% efficient while brush motors 
are 75-80% efficient. 
Maximize endurance, 
determine battery 
size required.   
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Component  Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Popular 
Brand/ Type 
Motor Power 
Ensure a power to weight ratio of 
minimum 2:1 with a goal of 3:1 for 
maximizing endurance. Weight is 
total weight of air vehicle with 
payload and batteries. Power is the 
max thrust of all motors with 
propellers. 
Ensures correct 
power draw for 
battery and ESC 
design. Ensures 
hover around 50% 
throttle position to 
meet endurance.   
Motor Torque 
Higher torque allows for quicker 
changes in speed and easier user 
tuning. 
Torque is a low 
design consideration 
since the air vehicle 
is not acrobatic.   
Motor KV 
Pick appropriate KV motors for 
propeller size. Lower KV motors 
pair with larger propellers and higher 
KV motors pair with smaller 
propellers. Ensure propeller size is 
not at the edge of motor design 
space. 
Promotes better 
motor propeller 
efficiency, benefiting 
endurance and 
payload weight.    
ESC Sizing/type 
Once motors are selected pick ESCs 
which can handle amp draw for 
motors. Always step up a size in 
ESCs, if motors are drawing 25A 
choose 30A. Frame and design 
considerations can dictate 4-in-1 
ESC or ESCs for each motor. Ensure 
peak current, cell size, programming, 
and weight of ESC meet design. 
Evaluate ESCs on brand reputation. 
ESCs are critical to 
preventing motor 
failure. Design 
margin should be 
built into ESCs for 
flight reliability. 
Castle Talon, 
KDE 
BEC Sizing/type 
Flight computer, sensors, and other 
electronics which require voltages 
differing from that of the battery will 
require BECs. Multiple components 
can run off the same BEC if they 
have similar voltage ranges. 
Evaluate BECs on the voltage range 
and brand reputation. 
BECs are critical for 
components that 
require voltage levels 
different than the 
battery (most likely 
5V). If the BEC fails 
so does the 
component.   
Wiring  
Gage Check 
and 
Connectors  
Ensuring wiring and battery 
connectors are proper size for 
current demands.  
Ensures reliable 
power distribution  
Deans 
connectors 
for low 
current, XT 
family for 
medium to 
high 
Video 
Transmitter/ 
Receiver  
Range/quality/ 
type 
Ensure video transmitter choice 
interfaces with GCS, meets range 
and quality demands. Ensure 
onboard transmitter fits within 
weight budget.  
Ensures video system 
meets requirements  
TBS Ground 
Station, 
Insight SE 
Transmitters/ 
Receiver Signal Budget 
Ensure the signals for RC, GCS, and 
video are at different frequencies so 
all systems function properly  
Prevents conflicting 
signals and all 
systems transmit 
Futaba (RC), 
Frsky (RC), 
Turnigy 
(RC), 3DR 
(telem) 
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Component  Category Checklist Rules Benefits 
Popular 
Brand/ Type 
Multiple Power Budget 
Document power demand for 
electronic components and evaluate 
against proposed battery 
design/choices. 
Establishes battery 
options and 
theoretical range    
Battery 
Size/Number/ 
Cell count  
Select batteries which can meet 
power demands, and endurance 
requirements. Select mah, cell count, 
and number of batteries. 
Establishes system 
weight and aids in 
endurance 
calculations Multistar 
Multiple Weight Budget 
Add all components weight and 
determine if selected frame is 
appropriate. Determine projected 
endurance and evaluate against 
requirements.  
Established 
endurance envelope, 
and packing weight   
 
 The top level of the physical architecture is defined by a block diagram shown in Figure 
24. The block diagram displays systems, components, and sub components. The architecture 
shows there are two modes of control, one through the GCS and the other through a RC 
controller. The next level of detail is displayed though an internal block diagram, that reveals 
both the physical, data, and power connections between components. The system is broken down 
into three sub-systems. Flight control is responsible for performing controlled flight of the 
SUAS. Payload system is responsible for the functionality of the on-board sensor. The GCS is 
responsible for sending command signals from the operator to the SUAS and receiving 
information from both the flight control and payload subsystems. The internal block diagram is 
shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 24. SUAS Physical Architecture 
 
Figure 25. SUAS Internal Block Diagram 
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 The physical architecture diagrams aid in developing design trades within the system. 
Design trades can be architectural, configuration, or component based. Architectural trades 
change the overall design of the SUAS system. An example would be implementing six motors 
versus four motors, driving a change of frame for a quad rotor to hexa rotor. Architecture trades 
allocate changes to the entire system. In the case of moving from a quad to hexa rotor changes 
the entire componentry of the system due to a larger frame. It also changes the layout of where 
components are placed and configured on the SUAS. Due to this trickle-down effect architectural 
trades must be considered first in the design process.  
Configuration trades affect the number of components and/or the placement of 
components. An example of this is implementing a secondary battery designated for the payload 
system. This trade affects the wiring and powering configuration of the entire system. It also 
dictates if additional components are required for implementation, for example structural 
platforms, BEC, and PDUs. Since configuration trades change the layout, connections, and 
components within the SUAS, they must be considered second.  
Finally, there are component trades. Within component trades there are two levels, simple 
trades and complex trade. Simple trades are component swaps without impacts on the systems 
architecture and limited impact on configuration. Changing to a more reliable motor with a 
similar KV rating would be an example of this, since the new motor can be integrated without 
impacts to the rest of the architecture and configuration. Complex component trades drive 
changes to the system architecture or have a major impact on configuration. In the case of the 
ISR mission, complex component trades involve selection of a sensor and the ability to transmit 
the sensor data. An example of this is changing from an analog video transmission system to a 
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digital system. Digital transmission requires a change of transmitter and receiver pair, hardware 
and software video interface with GCS, camera and wiring changes.  
Each design trade has a cost and benefit to the system. Cost and benefits are scoped and 
evaluated against system requirements. By balancing these trades against prioritized 
requirements, informed design decisions can be made for the benefit of the system. An analysis 
of example design trades against the established ISR mission is detailed in Table 27. Example 
components for commercial SUAS are listed within table for reference. 
Table 27. SUAS Design Trade Space 
Trade Benefits Costs Example Type 
6 Motors 
Motor redundancy, system 
can accept 1-2 motor loss, 
larger lift, bigger payload 
Endurance, size, 
weight  
Tarot 680 (hex) vs. 
Tarot 650 (quad) Architecture 
Frame PDU Less parts/space/weight 
Soldering, more 
wiring, exposed to 
elements Tarot 650 Sport  Architecture 
Sensor Gimbal 
Range of video, decreased 
control burden on air 
vehicle, stable video 
Complexity, weight, 
size, space, 
endurance 
Yuneec Cgo3 4k 
 Configuration 
Payload Battery  
Endurance, Closed payload 
system for troubleshooting  
Weight, space, set-
up time 
6S 10000 mah 
primary battery, 3S 
850 mah payload Configuration 
BEC Power 
Regulator, 
opposed to ESC 
Higher power reliability, 
less heating  
Higher part count, 
weight, space 
CASTLE-
CSE010000400 Configuration 
4 in one ESC 
Less parts, less wiring, 
combines PDU and ESC, 
protected from crash 
Cooling, hard to 
replace component if 
it fails, single point 
of failure, poor 
reliability for high 
energy 
AIKON AK32 35A 
BLHELI_32 Configuration 
Dedicated PDU 
Less wiring, dedicated 
wiring hub 
Soldering can be 
failure point 
REALACC Matek 
Mini Power 
Distribution Board Configuration 
GCS Laptop 
Better troubleshooting, 
robust user control, 
processing power 
Weight, space, set-
up time 
Panasonic 
Toughbook  Configuration 
GCS 
Tablet/phone 
Simplified interface, 
lightweight, space, 
portability 
Troubleshooting, 
user options iPad mini Configuration 
GCS Open 
Source 
User editability, rapid 
updates, security  
Requires in depth 
knowledge of 
software QGroundControl Configuration 
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Trade Benefits Costs Example Type 
GCS Closed 
Source 
Stable baseline, simple 
interface 
Limited to make 
changes, restricts 
component use, DoD 
security concerns  Configuration 
Retractable 
Landing Gear  Increase video field of view  Weight, complexity  
Tarot 650 Sport 
servo retractable 
landing gear 
Simple 
Component 
Plastic Propellers  
Dampening vibrations due 
to material flex 
Efficiency loss due 
to material flex, 
durability 
Aerostar Composite 
Propeller 15x5.5 
Grey (CW/CCW) 
Simple 
Component 
Carbon Fiber 
Rigid to prevent flex, 
durability 
Require balancing, 
prone to cracking 
from crash KDE-CF155-DP 
Simple 
Component 
Folding 
Propellers 
Storage size, store system 
with propellers mounted 
(reduce setup time), leading 
and lagging creates 
balancing effect, noise 
Sensitive to fastener 
tension to mitigate 
flex, manufacturing 
to balance is difficult KDE-CF155-DP 
Simple 
Component 
Traditional 
Propellers 
Data availability, proven 
designs 
Misbalancing of 
propeller in 
horizontal position, 
excess vibration, 
increase motor 
stress, storage 
Dynam 15x5.5 
Carbon Fiber 
Propellers for 
Multirotor (CW and 
CCW) 
Simple 
Component 
Triple Blade 
Propellers 
Increased thrust for smaller 
propeller size 
Endurance, 
efficiency  KDE-CF155-TP 
Simple 
Component 
FPV sensor Weight, size, live video Range, video quality Runcam Eagle 2 
Complex 
Component 
HD sensor  
Video quality, video 
storage  
Latency, weight, 
size, possible RF 
interference, power FLIR Duo, GoPro 
Complex 
Component 
Analog Video 
Transmission  
Light components, low 
latency. Simple design will 
not freeze. 
Poor video quality, 
low frame rate, no 
encryption 
TBS Ground 
Station, 2.4 Ghz, 
Yagi antenna 
Complex 
Component 
Digital Video 
Transmission Higher image quality 
Image processing/ 
compression, 
latency, few out of 
box solutions 
Amimon 
Connex LR Complex Component 
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Frame Selection 
 
Figure 26. Component Selection Process 
 Designing the system is performed by progressing through the design trade space, 
evaluating decisions against the design checklist, and evaluating component selections against 
requirements. The first trade space area to evaluate is architectural decisions, based on frame 
selection. The frame affects the following requirements: endurance, transport, set up time, and 
number of operators required for set up. Following the design trade space, Table 27, the first 
trade is the number of motors. Research revealed current commercially available hexarotors are 
unable to meet the transport and endurance requirements established in Table 2. In turn, the 
design must be based on a quadrotor architecture. Commercially available quadrotor 
architectures were investigated. The candidate quadrotor architectures are presented in Table 28. 
These candidate architectures show either recommended componentry or proven builds by the 
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manufacture, providing realistic endurance values. Frames were discriminated based on 
component integration space, endurance, and ease of transport. 
Name Foxtech Hover 1 Foxtech F1000 Pro  Tarot Peeper Tarot 650 Matrix-I 
Take-Off 
Weight 
1400 g (battery 
excluded, as 
configured) 1900g 1565 g 
476g, 1700g 
(total) 2177 g 
Frame 
Material  Carbon Fiber  Carbon Fiber  
Carbon Fiber 
hub, aluminum 
arms Carbon Fiber 
Carbon fiber 
and 
aluminum 
arms 
Frame Type Quad Quad Quad Quad Quad 
Folded 
Dimensions 
285 mm x 285 mm x 
175 mm, Foldable 
arms 
Detachable Arms 
with configured 
ESC, Motor, and 
propeller dimension 
of arm 310 mm. 
Quick disconnect. 
Foldable arms 
to 750 mm, pre-
assembled 
motors and esc 
Foldable 
arms to 650 
mm and 
landing gear. 
Air vehcle 
folds flat. 
Foldable 
arms to 780 
mm x 295 
mm (w) x 
110 mm (h) 
Unfolded 
Dimensions 
640 mm x 640 mm x 
280 mm 
560 mm X 160 mm 
(tall) 
440 mm X 210 
mm X 258 mm 
(tall) 
650 mm X 
650 mm X 
170 mm   
Flight time  
55 mins (as 
configured) 60 min  45-60 min  45 min  40-42 min 
Motors T-Motor MN3508  
T-Motor U8 Pro, 
brushless 
4008 Brushless 
Motor TK2955 
T-motor 
Antigravity 
4004  U5 T-Motor 
KV  380 100 330 300   
Prop 
Foxtech 15522 
Folding Propeller  
Foxtech Supreme 
28" 
TL 2948 17.5" 
Folding Props  
T-motor 
15x5 Carbon 
Fiber 15" 
ESC 
Hobbywing X rotor 
40 A  
T-motor Flame 60 
A 40 A ESC 
T-motor 25A 
2s-6s 
Simonk ESC 40 A 
Landing 
Gear Foldable Aluminum 
Carbon Fiber, 
detachable    
Foldable 
carbon fiber 
Static carbon 
fiber 
GPS Pixhawk DJI A3       
Batteries 10000 mah 6s Li-ion 
(2) Li-ion 12500 
mah  
Lipo 10000 
mah, 6S   
22000 mah 
6s battery 
Camera  
HD 10 X zoom 
FH310Z or W (250g) 
Multiple, 
exchangeable      
Hero 4/ 3 
Gimbal or 
600TVL 
Camera 
Gimbal 3 Axis         
GCS Ipad Mini Ipad       
RC Control/ 
Receiver 
Futaba 14SG Radion 
Controller, Taranis 
X9D Plus RC 
DJI 
Lightbridge/Futaba 
14 SG    
FrSky D8R-
XP Receiver 
Futaba 
EZUHF 
98 
 
Name Foxtech Hover 1 Foxtech F1000 Pro  Tarot Peeper Tarot 650 Matrix-I 
Flight 
Computer Pixhawk DJI A3/DJI N3   
3DR 
Pixhawk 
Naza V2 
Flight 
Controller 
Environment     Rain Proof       
Feasibility 
Possible design 
requires control 
redundancy. Room 
for components. 
Too large/heavy to 
transport 
Possible design, 
large folded 
dimension, low 
clearance for 
gimbal 
integration 
Too large for 
transport, 
low 
endurance 
Low 
endurance 
 
Table 28. Quadrotor Frame Options 
The frame selected was Foxtech Hover 1with a configured endurance of 55 minutes, 
room for additional components, small folding dimensions for transport. It was the only frame to 
meet the discrimination criteria. Table 29 shows more detailed specifications of the frame. The 
selected frame provides a take-off weight as configured, this weight includes 4 motors, 4 ESCs, 4 
propellers, frame, landing gear, and wiring. This configuration provides a baseline for more 
reliable component swaps as progress is made in the design. Additionally, the frame selected 
does not include an integrated PDU. Exposure to weather elements and transport risk preclude 
PDU integration for the ISR mission. 
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Table 29. Quadrotor Frame Options (Foxtech, 2018; glassfox, 2017) 
Name Foxtech Hover 1 
Take-Off Weight 
1400 g (battery excluded, as 
configured) 
All Up Weight 2300 g 
Frame Material  Carbon Fiber  
Frame Type Quad 
Frame Weight  596 g 
Folded Dimensions 
11.22 in x 11.22 in x 6.89 in, 
Foldable arms 
Unfolded 
Dimensions 25.20 in x 25.20 in x 11.02 in 
Flight time  55 mins (as configured) 
Motors T-Motor MN3508  
Motor Weight 82 g 
KV  380 
Prop 
Foxtech 15522 Folding 
Propeller  
ESC Hobbywing X rotor 40 A  
Landing Gear Foldable Aluminum 
Battery 6S3P Lithium Ion 9500 mah 
Battery Weight 900 g 
Camera 
FH310 Z 1080P w/3 axis 
gimbal 
Camera System 
Weight 368 g 
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Figure 27. Foxtech Hover 1 Folded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018) 
101 
 
 
Figure 28. Foxtech Hover 1 Unfolded Dimensions (Foxtech, 2018) 
 
 Evaluating the frame against the design check list for type/size category reveals the frame 
can support required components and meets the packaging requirement of fitting in a ruck sack 
of 22" X 14" X 9". It currently contributes 1.4 kg to the allocated 5 kg system weight. The 
material category for the frame is carbon fiber with aluminum legs which supports a high level of 
frame stiffness supporting controlled flight. Setup time for the frame, as configured, is 150 
seconds by one operator; this includes deploying four arms, four landing gear, connecting a GPS, 
connecting a battery, and connecting a camera system (N, 2016). This setup time is within the 5-
minute requirement objective and promotes operator design criteria of simplicity and prevention 
of betrayal. Landing gear are static which increases system reliability by eliminating a landing 
gear retraction servo. The landing gear are relatively small and are acceptable being within the 
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proposed cameras field of view. Integration of a gimbal will be investigated to mitigate the 
impact of the landing gear on imagery.  
Motor Selection 
 The next design point considered is motor selection. The Foxtech Hover 1 base 
configuration uses T-Motor MN3508 at 380 KV paired with 15” folding propellers. T-motors are 
a trusted brand and a quality motor selection, per online sources. Per T-motors website a 15” 
propeller at 50% on a 6 cell (6S) battery has power demand of 80 W, thrust of 820 g, and an 
efficiency of 10.26 g/W. With a thrust of 820 g/motor the total lift capability of the air vehicle is 
3.28 kg at 50% throttle. All up-base configuration weight is 2.3 kg, therefore a 50 % hover is 
achievable. The power to weight ratio must be checked for the max thrust of the motors. At 
100% throttle four motors produce 7.52 kg of thrust, dividing by air vehicle all up weight gives a 
ratio of 3.27. This meets the goal design checklist criteria of a power to weight ratio of 3. In fact, 
there is trade space with this value. A smaller 14” propeller could be used leveraging a higher 
efficiency albeit at the cost of thrust. With a 14” propeller 2.84 kg of thrust is produced at 50%, 
and the max thrust produced is 6.92 kg. Dividing this thrust by air vehicle all up weight gives a 
thrust to weight ratio of 3. If slightly more thrust and efficiency are required out of motor in 
order to handle additional weight or endurance, the T-Motor Antigravity 4006-380 are a design 
option. Paired with a 15” propeller the motor produces 805 g of thrust at 74.4 W with a 10.82 
efficiency. Max thrust produced is 8.9 kg, giving a power to weight ratio of 3.87. Both motor’s 
recommend motor or bearing change after 60 flight hours (T-Motor, 2017, 2018a).  
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Figure 29. T-Motor MN3508 380 KV (T-Motor, 2018b) 
 
 
Figure 30. T-Motor Antigravity 4006 KV380 (T-Motor, 2018a) 
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ESC Selection 
 With the motors selected, ESCs are selected and sized. The ESC design trade is either an 
ESC for each motor or a 4-in-one ESC. For the selected ISR mission single ESCs promote the 
operator’s design criteria of simplicity. As previously stated, the number of parts the operator 
must interact with to operate or repair the system should be low and intuitive. Time is the 
operator’s most valuable resource. While an ESC for every motor is four more parts than a 4-in-
one ESC, the repair and troubleshooting are less time consuming. If a 4-in-one ESC fails all 
motors fails. In a 4-in-one ESC failure, the fault is not isolated, therefore the operator is unable to 
discern the cause of the failure. The failure may be the flight computer, battery, wiring, or ESC. 
Additionally, the 4-in-one ESC is often located in the center of the air frame for center of gravity 
purposes, this makes it more difficult to access, troubleshoot, and repair. Single ESCs are placed 
within the frame at the arm junction points, allowing for user accessibility. A quick inspection on 
a single ESC will reveal if a failure has occurred, as black burnt electronics will be visible. 
Design recommendations from AFIT’s ANT Lab staff is to use ESCs for each motor for all 
multirotor designs. Their experience has revealed single ESCs are more reliable in handling 
current demands for multirotors greater than 1 kg.  
 Sizing for ESCs are based on current rating. Current rating is set at two levels, continuous 
and burst. The current the ESC will experience is based on the maximum current the motor will 
experience. These values can be determined by motor specification provided by the supplier. If 
the data is not provided by the supplier, the max current for the motor is determined by dividing 
the motor rated watts by battery voltage. For the ISR mission the SUAS is most likely using 6S 
or 4S lithium polymer or lithium ion batteries to achieve the required flight endurance. The S 
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rating of the battery is the number of cells, each cell carries 3.7 volts. Therefore, a 6S battery 
carries a voltage of 22.2 V and a 4S 14.8 V.  
 For the two motor solutions selected the maximum amperage is provided by the suppler. 
Suppliers often test maximum amperage at motor efficiencies less than 100%, down to 80% 
efficiency. For a conservative design the assumed efficiency of tested by T-motor is 80%, a 
factor of 1.25 will be applied to the maximum amperage. MN3508 motor has a list maximum 
14A, with a factor of 1.25 this raises to 17.5A (T-Motor, 2018b). The Antigravity 4006-380 has a 
maximum of 16A, with a factor of 1.25 this raised to 20A (T-Motor, 2018a). In turn, the design 
requires an ESC rated greater than 20A. A 25A Castle Talon ESC handling up to 6S battery is a 
good choice. This ESC comes with an 8A BEC for handling any servos required in the build, an 
example would be a gimbal. It provides a user manual for install, operation, and ESC mode 
programming (Castle Creations, 2013).  
 
Figure 31. Castle Creations Talon 25 AMP ESC, 6S/25V with 8 AMP BEC (Castle Creations, 
2018) 
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Propeller Selection 
 The next design decision is the selection of propellers. Sizing for the propeller is based on 
frame and motor limitations. The current frame unfolded diameter is 640 mm and can handle up 
to a 17” propeller. Both selected motors are specified at 15” with the MN3508 operating at 70°C 
and Antigravity 4006-380 46°C.  The temperature was recorded on the surface of the motor in 
100% throttle for 10 minutes. 70°C is a high operating temperature for brushless motors and 
operating at this level increases the probability failure. For a conservative design a 14” propeller 
should be paired with the MN3508 motors. The Antigravity motors allow for maximum 16” 
propeller but the operating temperature stated is HOT. In turn, the largest propellers safe for 
these motors are a 15.5” propellers, with a projected maximum temperature of 63°C. 
 In the case of the ISR mission, transportability is a critical function. The SUAS system 
must fit within the rucksack dimension in order to be transported to the deployment location. To 
achieve this the selected platform must be folded and stowed in the operator’s rucksack. To 
decrease deployment time folding propellers are preferred. The folding capability allows the 
propellers to be transported in an installed configuration on the frame. Folding propellers can 
induce frame vibrations and require proper torqueing of attachment points, this is a required 
preflight checklist step.  
Material is also an important selection step. Current multirotor options are either plastic 
or carbon fiber. Carbon fiber frames are more rigid and providing more control and are more 
efficient than plastic. Brittleness from ground impacts is mitigated by carrying spares.  A trusted 
brand of folding propeller is KDE. The KDE-CF155-DP is a 15.5” x 5.3 pitch propeller which 
meets the design criteria. The two bladed variant was selected over the three bladed variant since 
the design is for a small payload only, resulting in a low thrust requirement. KDE propellers are 
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dynamically-balanced matched pairs and must be kept in set, meaning if one blade tip is 
damaged the entire propeller pair must be replaced. Selection of the KDE propellers eliminates 
the MN3508 possibility from the trade space due to overheating concerns from a large propeller. 
 
Figure 32. KDE-CF155-DP 15.5” x 5.3 Propeller (KDE Direct, 2018) 
  
Flight Computer Selection 
 With the frame and the propulsion system established, the brain of the SUAS can be 
selected. The flight computer controls the functionality of the drone and bounds the user 
interfaces. In the ISR mission, the flight computer must handle dual control modes, programable 
flight and controlled flight. The main trade in for flight computers is open source software versus 
closed source. Top flight computers for open source are the Pixhawk family, and they include 
flight computers for various applications that run on the same software. User forums, 
documentation, software updates, troubleshooting guides are available to anyone for free at 
ardupilot.org.  
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The top-flight computers for closed source flight computers are built by DJI. 
Functionality of these computers are limited to what is provided in the device and software. DJI 
does provide the simplest out of the box solution, since the customer base is the general public 
with little to no drone experience. The DJI computers interface most reliably with DJI cameras 
and therefore limit design trade space. Recently the DoD has banned DJI drones and components 
over security concerns, citing “increased awareness of cyber vulnerabilities associated with DJI 
products (Newman, 2017).” Due to these security concerns the Pixhawk was selected as the 
flight computer for the ISR mission.  
 The current proven Pixhawk flight computer is the Pixhawk 2 Cube built by ProfiCNC. 
The Pixhawk 2 has a triple redundant isolated inertial measurement unit (IMU) system including 
accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, and barometers. It is also designed for operational 
conditions with enhanced drop and shock resistance. The Pixhawk 2 interfaces with Mission 
Planner or Qgroundcontrol mission planning software and telemetry information is transmitted 
either 915MHz or 433Mhz. Mission planning software can be run through a tablet, phone, or 
laptop. Included with the Pixhawk 2 is all required connection cabling, XT60 Battery Power 
module connector, micro USB cable, frame mounting pad, arming buzzer, and mounting screws. 
Figure 33 details the wiring diagram for the Pixhawk 2.  
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Figure 33. Wiring Diagram Pixhawk 2 Cube (Hex, 2018) 
 
Select Video Transmission System 
 The two most common transmission frequencies for video are 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz. 2.4 
GHz provides the longest range and best penetrating frequency for video transmission. This 
frequency is also the most popular for remote control transmitters therefore, deconfliction 
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between the two must occur to achieve reliable vehicle performance. With 2.4GHz being the 
main frequency for remote control, 5.8 GHz is the most popular frequency to gather first person 
video from the drone. At this frequency video latency is adequate but range and obstacle 
interference become a concern. Companies are experimenting with different frequencies; FPV 
Blue released a digital video system in 2017 which transmits at 1.2GHz, promoting a range of 7 
km with less than 50 ms latency at 720p video (FPV Blue, 2018). This system is still in beta 
development but shows future promise in image quality and range for live video systems. In 
addition to frequency, antenna types, antenna directionality, and transmitter power can affect the 
range of the transmission. For the ISR mission the 5.8GHz is the selected video frequency due to 
maturity of the technology and commercial availability.   
 The next design trade to consider is digital transmission versus analog. Analog 
transmission has benefits of direct signal, low latency, and large component market. 
Disadvantages to analog include low image quality, signal interference, low frame rate, and lack 
of encryption. Digital transmission provides high image quality at the cost of latency due to 
signal conversion. While A low latency rate is important for racing drones due to rapid position 
and speed changes, it is deemphasized in favor of image quality in aerial photography drones. 
The ISR mission requirements align closely with aerial photography, therefore a digital system is 
preferred over analog.  
 A current out of the box digital transmission solution at the 5.8 GHz frequency for over 
1-mile range is the Amimon Connex LR Receiver paired with the Connex Mini Transmitter. The 
system offers a directional range up to 3 km or 1.8 miles with HDMI out video. Video formats 
range from 1080p to 576p at less than 1 msec latency. The receiver system is easily backpack 
portable at 660 grams and dimensions of 7.9 in X 7.9 in X 2 in. Power for the receiver is 
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provided by a 3S-6S lithium polymer battery through a provided XT90 or XT60 connector. For 
maximum range a tripod is required for the receiver where the main lobe of the system’s five 
antennas spread 70° horizontally and 25° vertically. It is important to position the flight of the 
SUAS within this spread to achieve maximum range. 
 The system provides the following information to be displayed on the GCS: video 
strength, distance, video resolution, selected frequency, bandwidth, home location arrow. 
Additional telemetry information such as height, yaw, ground speed, flight mode, number of 
GPS, and aircraft battery charge may be displayed when the transmitter is connected to flight 
computer. The Connex system is compatible with the Pixhawk family of flight computers. Both 
the transmitter and receiver can be updated with required firmware provided by Amimcon. 
Additional specifications, performance parameters, and installation instruction can be found in 
the Connex LR Manual (Amimon, 2018). 
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Figure 34. Amimon Connex LR Receiver and Connex Mini Transmitter (getfpv.com, 2018a, 
2018b) 
 
Figure 35. Concept of Operations Connex LR Video Receiver (Amimon, 2018) 
 
Camera System Selection 
 The first design decision for the camera system is to incorporate a gimbal system. A 
gimbal provides user-controlled range independent of the air vehicle enabling stable image 
viewing. The selection of a gimbal comes at the cost of weight, power, and complexity, affecting 
requirements of endurance, user set time, and number of operators. Gimbals add from 100-300 g 
of payload and consume approximately 200-350mA, this can reduce endurance by up to 5 
minutes in the established endurance model, Table 33. 
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 In the transportation of the SUAS, the gimbal is required to be separate for the air 
vehicle, due to rucksack space limitation. This attachment process for the gimbal, prior to launch, 
can add 1-2 minutes of operator install time. The addition of the gimbal can also complicate the 
control structure of the SUAS in flight; if the flight is being controlled by remote control, gimbal 
operation may require a second operator due to task saturation. For an ISR mission to be 
successful some sort of intelligence must be gained by the operational user, a gimbal stabilizes 
the data provided by a camera maximizing the quality of the intelligence. The cost to the systems 
requirements from a gimbal is within the acceptable trade space, therefore a gimbal is 
recommended for better ISR capability.  
The second design decision is to incorporate a HD camera or a First-Person View (FPV) 
camera. Since the selected video transmitter is digital and HD capability a HD camera is selected 
for the design, promoting better image quality. The recommended camera system for the Foxtech 
Hover 1 frame is the FH310Z 1080p HD 10X Optical Zoom Camera with 3-Axis control. The 
gimbal system is designed to match the Hover 1 frame and mounts easily on the lower platform. 
The camera can display live day time video up 1080p, when paired with the Connex system. 
Additionally, the camera can record video while in flight through a 32 GB SD card slot. Camera 
functionality of zoom, move, and mode control can be integrated into the flight control 
transmitter for operator remote control. Mode controls include photo shoot, video recording 
start/stop, and live feed selections. The system demands static current of 240mA at 12V or 
320mA at 12V. All up-system weight is 370g with the camera weight 110g and the gimbal 
weighing 260g. Figure 36 shows the FH310Z camera with gimbal system and Figure 37 shows 
the camera system mounted on the Hover 1 platform.  
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Figure 36. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System (Foxtech, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 37. FH310Z Camera with Gimbal System Mounted on Foxtech Hover 1 Platform 
(Foxtech, 2017) 
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Power System Selection 
 Trades for the power system include battery chemistry type, cell count, and inclusion of a 
payload battery. Proven battery chemical technology for SUAS include lithium polymer or 
lithium ion. Lithium polymer batteries have become popular due to high C rating or discharge 
capability. Lithium polymer batteries with medium capacity, 8,000 mah to 10,000 mah, have a C 
rating ranging from 10 to 30 C, while similar lithium ion batteries possess C ratings of 3C to 5C. 
The C rating on the battery determines how much amperage can be safely drawn by the motors. 
This max safe current draw per motor is determined by multiplying the rated battery capacity by 
the C rating and dividing by the number of motors. This value is then compared to the motors 
current draw at 100% throttle for design viability. 
 The selected Antigravity motors provide data for a 16” propeller with the maximum 
current draw at 100% throttle of 17.5A (T-Motor, 2018a). With four motors, the required current 
for the propulsion system is 70A. A lithium ion battery with a 9,000 mah capacity and 5C rating 
can provide a total of 45A. Since this value is less than the required 70A, lithium ion batteries are 
not a viable design. Conversely, a 9,000 mah lithium polymer battery with a 10C rating provides 
90A meeting the design requirements. Therefore, a lithium polymer battery is selected for the 
ISR mission.  
 Cell count is described in series and parallel for batteries. Cells in series add 3.7 volts for 
each cell to the overall battery voltage. For example, a 6S or 6 series cell has a voltage of 22.2 
and a 4S has a voltage 14.8. Higher battery voltage allows for lower current draw, less voltage 
sag, and higher response in motors. These performance improvements come at the cost of added 
battery weight, which may reduce endurance. For mission reliability purposes the lower current 
draw keeps the battery cooler battery during flight, promoting maximum life for the battery. 
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From a user control perspective 6S batteries enable a more responsive multirotor due to lower 
voltage sag under load, enabling the motors to change RPM more rapidly (Liang, 2018). For the 
ISR mission responsiveness is important to prevent enemy detecting and for taking evasive 
maneuvers to ditch the air vehicle. For these reasons a 6S battery is desired.  
 The final design point for the power system is for a payload battery. Payload batteries 
allow the operator to independently test and troubleshoot the payload system prior to flight 
without effecting endurance time. Of course, an added payload battery adds weight for both the 
air vehicle and the operator to transport to the deployment location.  
In flight, the payload battery does add another failure point to the system, if the payload 
battery fails the functionality of surveillance is not upheld. Although the criticality of this failure 
is reduced, in most cases, from a category I to a category III. The operator will be able to recover 
the aircraft, isolate the fault to the payload system, and replace the defective component with a 
spare within a short period of time. Conversely, if the system only contained a primary battery 
and this component failed the air vehicle will no longer perform the function of flight, and the 
mission would terminate. These risk mitigations for both preflight and in-flight show that use of 
a payload battery is warranted if the threshold requirement value of endurance can be meet.  
 From the above discussion the system will include two batteries, primary for flight and 
secondary for payload. The primary battery will be a 6S lithium polymer. Current ratings for the 
battery selected is based on endurance calculation aimed at achieving the threshold requirement 
at 45 minutes of flight with the associated all up weight for the air vehicle. A current trusted 
brand for multirotors recommend by the ANT Lab staff and online drone blogs is Multistar 
batteries. This brand experiences low level of failures in flight and provides nominal flight 
performance. A Multistar High Capacity 10000mAh 6S 10C Multi-Rotor Lipo Pack XT90 at a 
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weight of 1189g provides a projected flight time of 48 minutes per endurance calculations 
performed in Table 33.  
 
Figure 38. 10000mAh 6S 10C Multi-Rotor Lipo Pack XT90 (Amazon, 2018) 
 
Flight Remote Controller Selection  
 The transmitter of the remote controller is what the operator uses to send commanded 
input to the air vehicle. The receiver on board the air vehicle receives the commands from the 
operator and sends the commands to the flight computer to perform the actions. Important 
aspects to consider for the remote controller pair is range, ease of use, functionality, and 
durability.  
A leading brand for flight controllers and revivers is Futaba. Remote control forums and 
user reviews place trust in Futaba for reliability, range, and build quality. The Futaba T14SG is 
considered on one of the most reliable transmitters on the market (“Which Is The Best 
Quadcopter Transmitter?,” 2018). It includes 14 channel control or 14 functions commands 
which can be sent to the aircraft. This is useful for the operator to control the flight of the air 
vehicle and to control the camera system when the flight of the air vehicle is being controlled by 
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the autopilot. User reviews and groups describe the maximum range of the 2.4Ghz transmitter at 
4.5 km or 2.8 miles. This range is evaluated at a clear line of sight and is reduced to under a mile 
with obstacle interference. The Futaba T14SG transmitter can contain up to 30 models, meaning 
30 different SUAS or configurations can be flown with the same transmitter. The transmitter also 
has the ability to receive telemetry, battery, and link data to a 1.75 X 3 in backlit LCD screen, 
providing critical information to the operator. Another benefit of this transmitter is that it can be 
paired with any Futaba 2.4Ghz receiver, further increasing the systems modularity (Futaba, 
2018). With any remote-control system, it is important for the operator to train and become 
familiar with the controller’s function and feel, to mitigate any potential user induced error into 
the system. 
 
Figure 39. Futaba T14SG transmitter (Futaba, 2018) 
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GCS Selection  
 With the selected flight computer as a Pixhawk 2, the GCS software is bounded to open 
source options. Popular software includes Mission Planner, APM Planner 2, MAV Proxy, 
QGroundControl, and UgCS. The only software which is compatible with all platforms to 
include Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, Andriod and iOS is QGroundControl (ArduPilot Dev 
Team, 2016). This maximizes platform flexibility and minimizes the amount of software 
operational users must be familiar with. Key interface features of QGroundControl are mission 
planning for autonomous flight, flight map display of vehicle and tracking information, video 
streaming with instrument displays, and support for multiple vehicles. Software downloads and 
complete user guide is available online at https://docs.qgroundcontrol.com/en/.  
 The next step for the GCS for the ISR mission is selecting the appropriate hardware. 
Options for hardware are laptop, tablet, phone, or a combination of devices. To meet the mission 
planning time objective of 10 minutes a laptop is preferred. The laptop configuration allows the 
operator to plan and view routes on a larger screen, input commands with a touchpad and 
keyboard, and access more features of the software. Once the air vehicle is set up and routes are 
planned, a phone configuration is desired for mission viewing and any route deviation. A phone 
can be mounted on the flight transmitter, enabling the operator to view mission progress and 
video feed through the phone while controlling the air vehicle. A two GCS system allows one 
operator to focus on flight and another operator to focus on surveillance, mitigating risk for each 
function. Since two operators for operations is a threshold requirement, this is an acceptable 
trade. A Panasonic Toughbook is an excellent option for handling a rugged deployed 
environment for a primary GCS handling drops, humidity, high temperature, and vibrations. 
Packing weight for the Toughbook is 4.2 lbs at 10.7” x 13.6” x 1.2”.  
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Figure 40. QGroundControl User Interface (“QGroundControl User Guide,” 2018) 
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Budget Allocation 
 
Figure 41. Budget Allocation Process 
 
 Once all components are selected for the ISR mission the budgets for frequency, weight, 
and power must be allocated. The frequency budget ensures the telemetry, command and control, 
and video signals are within their own band, preventing harmful system interactions. Table 30 
shows the signal frequency for the selected components. All systems are in separate frequency 
bands and the system is projected to perform nominally.  
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Table 30. Frequency Budget 
System Component  Frequency  
Flight Telemetry  
3DR Telemetry Radio 
Transmitter/ Receiver 
915MHz or 
433Mhz  
Video Transmitter  Connex LR System 5.8GHz 
Remote Control 
Transmitter 
Futaba 14SG Transmitter 
and Receiver 
2.4GHz 
Frequency 
Hopping  
 
 The next budget to perform is the weight allocation for both the air vehicle and additional 
components. The weight of the air vehicle is important since the threshold requirement is 5 kg 
and is also a critical piece of information for endurance calculations. The additional components 
weight, used for ground support, provide the total system weight. Components not previously 
mentioned for the air vehicle include HERE+ GPS, Pixhawk 2 Power Module (5V), 850mAh 3S 
lithium polymer payload battery, and additional wiring. Combined with the previous air vehicle 
components this provides an all up weight of approximate 3 kg. Components not previously 
mentioned for the additional components include a tripod transmitter mounting and 5200mAh 4S 
lithium polymer for transmitter power. Additional component weight is approximately 5.2 kg 
bringing the complete system weight to 8.3 kg. Table 31 details the componentry weight for the 
ISR SUAS.  Included in the table is the system cost and air vehicle cost, where air vehicle cost 
include all components except GCS, RC transmitter, Video receiver, and tripod. 
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Table 31. Weight Budget with Cost 
Component  
Air Vehicle 
Weight (g) 
Pack 
Weight 
(g) Cost ($) 
Hover 1 Frame 596   1400 
4X Antigravity MN4006 Motors w/wiring  272   300 
4X KDE-CF155-DP 15.5" Folding Propellers  58.8   156 
4X KDE-DPA-ML Propeller Adapters 56   80 
4X Castle Talon 25 AMP ESC w/wiring  71.6   180 
Pixhawk 2 Cube 39   250 
Pixhawk 2 Power Module  24   
Incl 
w/Comp 
Here GPS 49   95 
Connex LR Video Receiver    660 1750 
Connex Mini Transmitter 60   650 
Telemetry Transmitter/ Receiver 15 15 25 
Camera 108   
Incl 
w/Frame 
Gimbal 260   
Incl 
w/Frame 
850mAh 3S Lipo Payload 83   10 
10A 6S Lipo 1189   120 
Other Wiring  100   25 
Tripod   1180 100 
5.2 A 4S Lipo   430 50 
Futaba R7008SB Receiver 10.9   165 
Futaba 14SG Transmitter   980 650 
Panasonic Toughbook   1905 1450 
Sum 2992.3 5170 $7,456 
Air Vehicle Only Cost (less GCS, RC 
Transmitter, and Video Receiver)       $3,456 
 
 The last budget is performed on the power system. The power system is divided into two 
sections depending on their power source. The budget evaluates all components that demand 
power, less the motors. The control section, powered by the main battery, powers the Pixhawk 2, 
Futaba receiver, and telemetry receiver. The video section, powered by the payload battery, 
includes the gimbal, camera, and Connex Mini transmitter. Power draw values obtained from the 
product specifications are provided in Table 32, along with required power levels. The control 
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system power level is managed by a 5V Pixhawk 2 power module and the video system is 
managed by direct voltage from the 3S payload battery at 11.1V.  
 
Table 32. Power Budget 
Component  
Power Draw 
(mA) 
Power 
(V) 
Pixhawk 2 280 
4.8 to 
5.4 
Connex Mini Transmitter 400 8 to 26 
Gimbal + Camera 280 11 to 12 
Futaba Receiver 75 
3.7 to 
7.4 
Telemetry Transmitter 25 3.7 to 6 
Sum Control 380  
Sum Video 680  
Sum 1060   
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Hover Endurance Calculation  
  
Figure 42. System Reliability and Requirement Analysis 
 With the power demand and all up weight determined for the air vehicle the hover 
endurance can be calculated. Using the propeller momentum theory, the theoretical time in hover 
can be calculated for the system (Phillips, 2004). The power required per propeller ideal is 
calculated using Equation 2. The propeller efficiency is set at 90% and air density is calculated at 
sea level and 20 °C. 
ܲ݅݅ ൌ 2ܣ௣ߩ ∗
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ఎ೛                                                         (1) 
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݀݅ܽ݉݁ݐ݁ݎ	݋݂	݌ݎ݋݌݈݈݁݁ݎ
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The ideal power per propeller fails to incorporate inefficiencies in electric motors, to account for 
this Equation 3 is used. For a brushless motor 85% efficiency is standard. The current per motor 
is calculated using Equation 4 based on the volts per cell, number of cells, and efficiency of the 
battery. The total current of the system is calculated by the current per motor multiplied by 
number of motors plus additional current required for the system, this is shown in Equation 5. 
The ISR SUAS has four motors and has an additional current requirement on the main battery of 
0.38A for control systems, seen in Table 32.  
Finally, the time in hover is calculated by accounting for the battery capacity, percent 
usable battery capacity and the efficiency of the battery. For the developed SUAS, the battery 
capacity is 10000 mah, a usable percentage of 85%, and an efficiency of 90%. Equation 6 shows 
this calculation. Table 33 shows the parameters and calculated information for the ISR SUAS 
hover time. The table shows a projected hover time of 48 minutes. This is a theoretical value and 
requires real world testing to determine the operational endurance incorporating factors such as 
humidity, temperature, wind, transitional lift, and system losses.  
ܲ݅ ൌ ௉௜௜ఎ೘ , ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ߟ௠ ൌ ݉݋ݐ݋ݎ	݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ	                                       (2) 
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௖௘௟௟ ܽ݊݀	݊௖ ൌ #	݋݂	݈݈ܿ݁ݏ																																							 (3) 
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Table 33. Endurance Calculations 
mass w/o primary battery and 
motors[kg] 1.531  Area P[m^2] 0.12 
gravity[m/sec^2] 9.81  Total mass[kg] 2.99 
air density[kg/m^3] 1.204  total mass lbs  6.58 
prop diameter[in] 15.5  P_prop_ideal, Pii[W] 43.34 
prop diameter[m] 0.3937  P_prop_reqd, Pi[W] 50.99 
prop efficiency 0.9  I_motor_reqd, Ii[A] 2.30 
motor efficiency 0.85      
number battery cells 6  I_total, It[A] 9.57 
rated battery capacity [Ah] 10      
battery voltage[volts] 22.2  t_endurance, th[min] 47.98 
battery mass [kg] 1.189    
nbatteries 1  Max safe Amp draw [A] 100 
battery efficiency 0.9  per motor [A] 25 
f_usable 0.85    
total usable batt capacity [A hr] 7.65    
nmotor 4    
motor mass[g] 68    
aux_current[A] 0.38    
battery C rating 10 
 
System Reliability  
 Using the component reliabilities researched in Table 21, a theoretical system reliability 
can be determined. The components researched support either flight or surveillance functions. If 
either of these functions fail while the SUAS is performed a mission, a total system failure has 
occurred. Components that enable flight for the ISR SUAS are a flight computer, 4 motors, 
frame, a primary battery, 4 ESCs, a BEC, a telemetry transmitter/receiver pair, a remote-control 
transmitter/receiver pair, and GCS. 
 All components except the transmitter/receiver pairs are in series configuration, meaning 
if one component fails in the chain the function of flight fails. Since the SUAS can be controlled 
by either autopilot or remote-control modes, this configuration allows one mode to fail and the 
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system will still perform the function of flight. This leads to a parallel configuration for the 
transmitter/receiver pairs.  
 Equation 7-9 show the calculations for system reliability for series and parallel systems 
respectively. Figure 43 shows the average reliability for the flight system of 0.8656, R1. Each 
component or component group displays its respective failure rate, λ, and reliability, R. Propeller 
failures are attributed to FOD contact in the environment, if this failure is mitigated by a clear 
operational environment the flight system reliability increased to 0.933, R2. The surveillance 
function has just three component types, a camera, payload battery and a video 
transmitter/receiver pair. The gimbal system is ignored in this analysis, its failure does not 
promote a critical category I failure. In other words, the surveillance function still occurs when 
the gimbal fails, this is a type II failure category. Figure 44 shows the reliability diagram for the 
surveillance system. For the SUAS system reliability the flight system reliability and 
surveillance system reliability are multiplied together. This creates two average system 
reliabilities, with propellers is 0.8615 and without is 0.9286. The resulting system MTTF is, per 
Equation 10, are 6.86 hrs with propeller failure and 13.63 hrs without propellers failures. 
 For a point of comparison, the MTBF for a car can be evaluated. MTBF is used as the 
criteria since a car can be repaired and put back into servable condition. A car has three critical 
subsystems that must function for the car to drive and transport people. These subsystems are the 
power train, tires, and brakes. Each subsystem has an associated MTBF based on a driving 
profile, these MTBFs are then added for a system MTBF, per Equation 11. The power train has a 
1500 hrs MTBF for 90,000 miles at 60 mph, the tires have 1000 hrs MTBF for 60,000 miles at 
60 mph, and the brakes have a 666 hrs for 40,000 miles. These subsystem MTBF result in a car 
MTBF of 315 hrs (Hamby, 2003). Reliability for a given operating time completed or conditional 
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reliability can be computed using Equation 12. For a 1.5 hrs operating period, equivalent to two 
SUAS missions, the SUAS reliability is 89.58% while the car reliability over the same period is 
99.52%. The SUAS reliability is determined without propeller failures.  
ܴ௦௘௥௜௘௦ ൌ ܴଵ ∗ ܴଶ ∗ ܴଷ …                                                     (6) 
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ܴ௦௬௦௧௘௠ ൌ ܴ௦௘௥௜௘௦ ∗ ܴ௣௔௥௔௟௟௘௟                                             (8) 
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                                                      (9) 
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Figure 43. Reliability Block Diagram, Flight System 
 
 
Figure 44. Reliability Block Diagram, Surveillance System 
Requirements Analysis  
 Table 34 details the projected performance of the selected ISR SUAS for each 
requirement. Setup time, ISR-1, which has a threshold value of 10 min is met by the ISR SUAS 
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with a projected time of 6 minutes. This time includes 150 seconds for air vehicle setup from a 
backpack, 60 seconds for video receiver setup on tripod, 60 seconds for primary and secondary 
battery, 60 seconds for remote control system setup, and 30 seconds for GPS initialization. This 
time is projected for one operator setting up the system, the time may be reduced with and 
additional operator. 
 ISR-2, mission planning time, objective is projected to be met using QGroundControl as 
the GCS software and a laptop as the GCS hardware. QGroundControl is a user-friendly 
interface for mission and route planning but does require operator training for efficient use. A 
laptop as a primary GCS enables quicker functionality for mission planning opposed to a tablet 
or phone. As previously mentioned, the system can be set up by one operator but is 
recommended to have two operators set up to reduce set up time. With two operators, one 
operator can set up the video system while the other sets up the air vehicle, reducing the set-up 
time to the objective value of 5 minutes. 
 ISR-4, deployment range, is limited by the video system. The selected LR Connex 
5.8GHz video receiver has a max directional range of 1.8 miles with a clear line of sight. The 
remote control and 433Mhz Pixhawk 2 Autopilot have ranges greater than 1.8 miles. Signal 
condition can impact this range and requires system level testing to prove out the SUAS range.  
ISR-5, resolution, has a threshold value of 30 pixels/݉ଶ to identify and track a moving 
vehicle. With the selected FH310Z 1080p HD camera a 30 pixels/݉ଶ can be met from 0-395 m 
without the aid of the 10x zoom function of the camera, using the zoom function will only 
increase this pixel density. Equation 13 was used to calculate the pixel length in meters for both 
the x and y direction (“DIY Drones,” 2013). Pixel density is determined by finding the number 
of pixels in 1݉ଶ or taking 1/P and multiplied for both x and y values. 
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 ISR-6, ensures the vehicle can hover over the target for 10 minutes. Hover over target is 
enabled in the ISR SUAS by using either position or altitude hold flight modes while controlling 
in remote control or autopilot flight. Since the air vehicle has a theoretical hover 48 minutes, the 
vehicle has time to transverse to the max range. 
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Table 34. Requirement Analysis for ISR Mission 
Rqmt Description  Objective  Threshold  
Priority 
Level Projected  
ISR-1 
Setup of system from 
unpacking to ready for 
launch shall be 5 min 10 min 2 
150 Sec for AV, 60 sec 
for video system, 60 sec 
for battery system, 60 
sec RC control, 30 sec 
for GPS: 6 minutes 
total 
ISR-2 
Mission planning time from 
coordinates provided to 
operator to ready for launch 5 min 10 min 3 
Depends on mission 
complexity, 5 minutes 
is projected using a 
laptop with 
Qgroundcontrol. 
ISR-3 Operators required for setup  1 2 5 
1 min, 2 ideal to buy 
down set up time 
ISR-4 
System shall have a range 
from deployment location of  2 mile 1 mile 11 
1.8 miles in LOS 
conditions 
ISR-5 
System shall provide 
resolution for tracking a 
vehicle    
30 
pixels/m^2 7 
Camera more than 
covers requirement. 
Has 30 pixels/m^2 at 
395 m without using 
10x zoom function.  
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Rqmt Description  Objective  Threshold  
Priority 
Level Projected  
ISR-6 
System shall loiter over the 
target and provide 10 
minutes video of target for  
100% of 
time 
85% of 
time 8 
Deconflicted A/V 
signals, selected high 
quality video 
transmitter, air vehicle 
can be placed in 
position hold. Hover 
endurance is 48 
minutes.   
ISR-7 
System shall transmit geo-
location    15 ft  17 
HERE GPS integrated, 
works with GLONASS, 
BeiDou, Galileo. 
Advertised within 8 ft 
50% of time.  
ISR-8 
System shall require 
dedicated operators for 
control and operations 1 2 6 
System can operate in 
1-2 operator 
configurations with 
dual GCS control. 
Flight modes are rc 
control or autopilot 
control modes. 
ISR-9 
Operator shall be able to 
identify ground targets while 
controlling vehicle    X 10 
Vehicle can be used in 
autopilot and operator 
can control camera 
zoom for video. GCS 
software for phone can 
display live video.  
ISR-10 
System shall display near 
real time imagery to the 
operator(s) 
2 sec 
delay 5 sec delay  12 
1 msec latency 
advertised by Connex 
with LOS, 30 FPS. 
Observed latency 30-46 
msec. 
ISR-11 
Operators required recovery, 
landing, and retrieval of the 
system  0 1 18 
1 to recover system, 0 
to destroy system via 
autopilot.  
ISR-12 
Endurance of the system 
while performing video shall 
be  
60 
minutes  45 minutes 9 48 minutes at hover  
ISR-13  
System shall perform "return 
launch" if communication is 
lost with operator   X 15 
Failsafes are 
programable by using 
in Qgroundcontrol. If 
lost link occurs for X 
amount of time the 
system will enter return 
to launch if programed.  
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Rqmt Description  Objective  Threshold  
Priority 
Level Projected  
ISR-14  
System shall indicate to 
operator if GPS is lost and 
allow for manual recovery 
mode   X 14 
HERE GPS and 
Qgroundcontrol provide 
information to operator 
on GPS status including 
number of satellites and 
HDOP, allowing air 
vehicle to enter failsafe 
or operator to command 
via remote control. 
ISR-15 
System shall provide status 
of battery to operator   X 13 
Battery information can 
be routed through 
Pixhawk 2 and sent via 
telemetry data to GCS 
ISR-16  
System altitude shall be 
greater than 100 ft except at 
launch and recovery    X 19 
Radio Control and 
autopilot all projected 
to work at greater than 
100 ft 
ISR-17 
System shall have the 
capability swapping in a 
night capable camera of 
0.001 LUX or better X   16 
.05 Lux, traditional 
color camera. Can 
handle twighlight 
conditions only.  
ISR-18 
System shall have a low 
noise profile of 50 db or 
lower at minimum safe flight 
altitude   X 4 
15.5" foldable 
propellers minimize 
sound profile. Sound 
testing required to 
confirm.  
ISR-19 
Air vehicle shall weigh less 
than 5kg and be packable in 
2 standard ruck sack 22" X 
14" X 9"    X 1 
A/V 3kg, support 
equipment 5 kg. All 
projected to fit within 
dimensions 
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V. Results and Conclusion  
 The preceding thesis outlines a tailored system engineering product development process 
for designing a SUAS for a given operational mission. Design constraints and the process 
support rapid development of low-cost aircraft with systematic reduction of failure mechanisms. 
The process was limited to Group I SUAS made from commercial components.  
The three contributions of this research are: a process to support Small Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (SUAS) design, tools to support the design process, and tools to support risk assessment 
and reduction for both design and operations. The product development process allows DoD 
program offices to own the technical baseline of an SUAS design, promoting better system 
understanding, responsiveness to operator needs, and complete understanding of the drone 
marketplace. This is a repeatable process for a given operational mission, documented in a user-
friendly pictorial and demonstrated using an exemplar SUAS design for an Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission set. Tools supporting risk assessment and 
reduction include operator checklists, fault tree diagrams, failure criteria, critical component 
definition, critical component reliabilities, and system reliability.  
 This chapter discusses how the (3) investigative questions were addressed from Chapter 
I, using the information from the ISR design exemplar in Chapter IV. In addition, 
recommendations in support of implementing the product development process in DoD program 
offices are provided. Lastly, topics for further research for expanding and refining the product 
development process are discussed.  
First Investigative Question 
What systems engineering methods are appropriate for a tailored rapid SUAS design 
process? 
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The defined SUAS product development process mirrors the Initial DoD System 
Engineering Process model displayed in Chapter III. The process pictorial is displayed in Figure 
11. The first step is the requirements analysis. In this step focus is placed on first establishing 
design needs and operational conditions from the operational user. This is a conversation, and if 
possible, face to face meeting between the design team and the operational user. This 
communication is paramount in identifying assumptions and clarifying needs. These needs are 
translated into specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time bound design requirements for 
standard to evaluate the future design against. 
 The second step is functional analysis and allocation. This step is first performed by 
translating the design reference into a use case diagram. The use case diagram maps specific 
functions the system must perform to provide use to the actors of the system. At another level of 
detail is the functional allocation which displays and helps identify critical functions of the 
system when evaluated against requirements. The final level of detail for the functional 
allocation is perform through a fault tree analysis. The fault tree analysis investigates all the 
ways critical componentry can fail on the SUAS for the given use cases for the system. Fault 
trees aid in developing operator checklists to mitigated pre-flight system risks promoting a 
reliable in-flight system. Operator checklists are an engineering product and discussed in further 
detail in the second investigative question. 
 The next step in the system engineering process model is the design synthesis, which is 
informed by decisions completed in the previous two steps. System design starts with the 
establishment of a physical architecture, aimed at meeting requirements and critical functions of 
the SUAS. By diagraming the physical architecture into a top-level view and integrated view 
(internal block diagram), the system design can view critical interfaces, information flow, and 
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component dependencies. This information aids in the physical component selection process, as 
design decisions can be processed through based on impact to other components and system 
performance. Componentry selection for the SUAS flows from components that constraint the 
system architecture from most to least. Frames are selected first since they define the physical 
architecture for the system, while the ground control station (GCS) is selected last due to a low 
impact physical impact to the air vehicle.  
With the design established, the final step of the system engineering process is system 
analysis and control. System analysis is completed with inputs from all previous steps and 
ensures the design is feasible in meeting the desired functions and requirements of the system. In 
the case of the ISR exemplar, engineering calculations were performed for SUAS hover 
endurance, system reliability, reliability for a mission, and pixel density. All other requirements 
were evaluated based on input from online drone blogs, Autonomous Navigation Technology 
(ANT) Lab Staff, and/or the authors experience.  
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Figure 11. SUAS Product Development Process 
Second Investigative Question 
What baseline design tools and heuristics are required to support decisions for vehicle 
performance, trades, reliability, assessment and follow-on designs?  
Engineering products that aid in decision making for are built into the SUAS product 
design process. The first product is general and displays current researched critical component 
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failure rates. It provides program offices data on how often failures occur for flight computers, 
motors, propellers, frames, batteries, electronic speed controllers, battery elimination circuits, 
signal receivers, cameras, and GCS. This data provide combined with the physical architecture of 
the SUAS enables a reliability analysis for the system. The system specific reliability analysis 
provides the failure rate for the overall system. These calculations are tailorable to system 
reliability for a given time and MTTF, providing valuable information on projected system life 
and maintenance cycles.  
The second product that promotes system reliability and performance are operator 
checklists. These checklists are developed from fault tree diagrams aimed at mitigating pre-flight 
errors that may be induced by the operator, environment, or transportation. Checklists provide 
operators short repeatable rules that provide common troubleshooting advice, aligned with 
specific components. Checklists are aligned with specific points in the SUAS lifecycle pre-flight, 
pre-deployment, and initial flight, aimed to mitigate specific risks for common situations. For the 
SUAS design team, checklists allow the majority of non-component risk to be mitigated for the 
system. In turn, system risk is distilled down to component failure rates aligned with the physical 
architecture. This provides the most accurate level of system reliability. Finally, a spares 
checklist is included to mitigate critical component errors that occur in the deployment location. 
The decision to incorporate spare kit comes at the cost of transportation of the system in the form 
of weight and space.  
Another valuable product to the program office is the critical component 
hazard/reliability matrix. This matrix displays the failure rates of SUAS components against the 
impact category to the system. The matrix is then color coded based on these two factors 
provided a high, medium, or low system risk. The hazard matrix provides program office 
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decision makers a visual depiction of what components are contributing the most risk to the 
system. This ranking of critical components informs investment for critical components in the 
form of testing, funding, and research. This process mitigates system design risk while executing 
shortened development timelines.  
In the system design phase, the design checklist and design trade space products provide 
a valuable roadmap for designer decisions. The design checklist is built for a multirotor design 
and provides critical design information for component sizing, selection, pairing, configuration, 
and analysis. The design trade space evaluates common trades for multirotor SUAS highlighting 
the impacts to established requirements. Additionally, the trade space identifies at what level in 
the architecture the trades occurs. This provides the knowledge to decision makers on when to 
evaluate trade’s in the design process, and the proposed trades impact on mission requirements. 
Using both of these products while building the SUAS design, provides a stable approach to 
evaluate requirements.  
The final engineering product is the component selection exemplar for the ISR mission. 
The process reveals the order to select components for the ISR mission and how each component 
constrains other components. Each time a component is selected the design trade space is 
narrowed, this enables designer to focus decision and shorten design cycles. The component 
selection process is mission dependent and based on the preference of the design team. In the 
case of the ISR mission, components were selected in order of architecture impact. 
Third Investigative Question 
What SUAS components are critical to mission success and can reliability rates be found, 
documented, and analyzed for these components?  
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 Critical components were determined to be components whose failure induce 
unrecoverable events. Unrecoverable events mean the SUAS can no longer be flow with system 
failure imminent. In addition, repair time for the system to regain critical functionality is too high 
for the operator to accept. In the case of the ISR mission, critical functions are flight, transport, 
provide power, surveillance, and be controlled. The components that must work to uphold these 
functions were determined to be the flight computer, motors, propellers, frame, battery system, 
ESCs, BECs, receivers/transmitters, camera, and GCS. 
 It is possible to determine an estimate of system reliability. From a physical architecture 
standpoint all components are in series configuration, except receivers/transmitters pairs, 
meaning if one component type fails the system enters an unrecoverable event. 
Receiver/transmitters pairs are in parallel configuration due to implementation of due control 
mode; one via remote control and one via autopilot control. This allows one control system to 
fail and still permit controlled flight.   
 Limited work has been performed on documenting failure rates for critical SUAS 
components. It is the author’s belief that this is due to the rapid technology advancement of the 
commercial drone market. Components are produced for short periods of time making reliability 
testing minimally beneficial to industry and academia, since new components will improve upon 
reliability. Future research is recommended on when it is worth investment in generating failure 
rate data for a given platform, based on the proposed design life of the system.  
Table 21 in Chapter 4 reveals the researched failure rates for critical components. Failure 
rates were found in various testing conditions including operational, research/theoretical, lab, or 
subject matter input. The table was validated by the AFITs ANT Lab staff as realistic values for 
commercially available components. One value was determined to be an outlier for the receiver 
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system at a failure rate of 0.37 failure per hour. It was determined either the product or operating 
environment was suboptimal and was not included in future calculations. 
 Component group failure rates were average and used as the component failure rate for 
system reliability calculations performed for the ISR system. Failures for components were 
assumed to be past the infant mortality rate and occur within the constant failure rate zone of the 
bathtub curve. At a constant failure rate, the components are in normal life of the bathtub curve 
and burn-in was performed to remove early life errors.  
Recommendations  
 The DoD can benefit from implementing mission specific SUASs for tactical and 
operation mission sets. SUASs remove mission demand for larger UAS assets, freeing up flight 
hours for strategic level operation. Additionally, the DoD can leverage the expanding 
commercial drone market for technology, integration, and documentation for rapid custom 
SUAS builds. The outlined SUAS product development process offers a simple roadmap to build 
such SUASs using system engineering methods.  
While the process is a roadmap to build SUASs; the process needs a plan to support 
operational implementation. A recommendation is to implement the product development 
process at the DoD SUAS training center, USAF 371st Special Operations Combat Training 
Squadron (SOCTS) Detachment 1. SOCTS is at a critical point in SUAS development cycles 
where training emergent technology occurs, and feedback is immediately provided. It is a center 
of excellence for SUAS expertise in the DoD. By incorporating the product development process 
at this location operator feedback on requirements, design, and checklists can be immediately 
garnered, shortening development timelines.  
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The initial system design of SUAS easily transitions to follow on platform developmental 
testing by the operational customer. This implementation would require acquisition personnel 
from various DoD service branches to ensure proper process documentation and management, 
along with investigation and implementation of future drone technology. With program office 
involvement on location, liaisons are available for documenting emergent operation needs and 
justifying future project funding. By implementing this process with actual on-site stakeholders 
of the system, not only will the product improve over time but so will the product development 
process itself.  
 An additional recommendation is for the DoD to invest in a reliability database for 
implemented critical components on deployed SUAS designs. This would allow the DoD and 
program offices to justify investment in critical componentry with high failure rates, promoting 
more reliable system designs. A component reliability database also informs future designs and 
architecture decisions for a given mission. Finally, deployed systems life, maintenance schedule, 
and reliability can be tracked, impacting future programmatic decision for sustainment or new 
platform development.  
Further Research  
 Implement SUAS product development process for all mission sets. This thesis focuses 
on building a product architecture around an ISR mission set. Further research would be required 
to see if the process and the engineering products of the process change for other SUAS mission 
sets outlined by United States Air Force SUAS Flight Plan: 2016-2036. This research would 
involve running through SUAS product development process for each mission set, documenting 
any required deviation from the process, and capture all engineering products including for 
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further design implications. This research would aid in validation or invalidation of the SUAS 
product development process.  
In depth reliability analysis of critical components. This thesis performed an initial 
reliability analysis of critical components, based on current document research. For a more 
robust reliability analysis research is required on determining quantitively which component 
brands and components have the highest reliability. Life and operational testing would be useful 
on top drone industry brands for motors, ESCs, flight computers, BECs, frames, 
receiver/transmitters, and sensors. Furthermore, the SUAS designer community would benefit 
from common test standards to ensure a stable reliability baseline for critical components.  The 
goal of reliability testing for the DoD would to possess a trusted manufacture list to choose 
SUAS design components from based on empirical evidence. This would aid in mitigation of 
early component life failures promoting a more predictable system reliability and life estimation.  
Failure mode testing for commercially fabricated drones. Failure rates of critical 
components were used to determine the system reliability of the SUAS in this thesis. An 
alternate way to determine system reliability is done by determining the probably of failure 
modes occurring. This analysis was left unperformed due to a lack of data on specific failures 
within the SUAS. This research would require flight a series of commercially fabricated drone 
platforms, documenting when failures occur, and investigate the root cause of the failure. This 
would provide failure information at level lower than the component level. For example, root 
cause analysis post SUAS flight failure may reveal the failure was attributed to motor over 
heating opposed simply motor failure. This testing would provide information on what failures 
are most common, allowing designer to not only implement material solutions but also 
operational, training, and architecture solutions. It would also provide information on what 
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platforms/designs excel in specific mission, narrowing the trade space for future 
platform/mission pairing.  
Lifecycle modeling for mission specific SUAS. Future investigation is required to 
determine the useful life of mission specific SUAS. Useful life for a SUAS is dependent on how 
long the design mission remains the same and how long the requirements the SUAS was 
designed to are stable.  In addition, program office personnel must balance system maintenance 
cost versus the cost of building a new system with potential upgraded capabilities. Timelines of 
new system testing, training, and deployment must also be considered in lifecycle analysis. 
Recommendations are required for the optimal SUAS deployment life considering all these 
factors. Product line turnover rates of the commercial drone industry would provide valuable 
starting point for research.  
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Appendix A. SUAS Fault Tree Diagrams  
Flight Function Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
Figure 45. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Full View 
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Figure 46. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Motor Failure 
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Figure 47. Generate Lift Fault Tree Diagram: Propeller and Flight Computer Failure 
148 
 
 
Figure 48. Provide Stability Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 49. Launch Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 50. Recover and Reuse Fault Tree Diagram 
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Transport Function Fault Tree Diagram 
 
Figure 51. Pack and Store Fault Tree Diagram 
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Power Function Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
Figure 52. Monitor Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 53. Distribute Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 54. Regulate Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 55. Store Fault Tree Diagram 
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Surveillance Function Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
Figure 56. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Full View 
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Figure 57. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Defect and Environment Failures 
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Figure 58. Observe Environment Fault Tree Diagram: Sensor Configuration and Gimbal Failures 
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Figure 59. Transmit and Receive Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 60. Human Interface Fault Tree Diagram 
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Control Function Fault Tree Diagrams 
 
Figure 61. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View 
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Figure 62. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Gimbal and Mode Failures 
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Figure 63. Payload Control Fault Tree Diagram: Zoom, Power, and Sensor Failures 
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Figure 64. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Full View 
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Figure 65. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: RC Failure 
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Figure 66. Flight Control Fault Tree Diagram: Autopilot and Flight Computer Failure 
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Figure 67. Failsafe Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 68. Guidance Fault Tree Diagram 
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Figure 69. Provide Status Fault Tree Diagram 
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Appendix B. SUAS Design Online Sources  
The sources detailed in this table were used to aid in building operator checklists, design 
checklists, design trade space, and component selection performed in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
Table 35. SUAS Design Online Sources 
Name  Type Focus 
Top 
Source* 
ardupilot.org Blog 
Pixhawk flight computer 
help  X 
rcgroups.com Blog general advice X 
phantompilots.com  Blog DJI advice X 
diydrones.com Blog general advice X 
dronetrest.com Blog general advice X 
droneflyers.com Blog general advice   
reddit.com/r/Multicopter Blog general advice   
blog.ravpower.com Blog 
general advice on power 
sources   
dronereviewhot.blogspot.com Blog general advice   
foxtechfpv.com  Store custom Builds   
store-en.tmotor.com  Store motors/ propellers   
kdedirect.com Store motors/ propellers   
hobbyking.com Store drone components   
flir.com Store cameras   
castlecreations.com Store electronics   
team-blacksheep.com Store/Infosite cutting edge components    
myfirstdrone.com 
Infosite/ Product 
reviews DJI focus   
ecalc.ch.com Endurance Calculator  analysis    
futabarc.com Manufacture RC transmitter specs   
amimon.com Manufacture video transmitter specs   
aopa.org Pilots Association news/tips/general advice   
blacktieaerial.com How to Guide build instructions and tips   
beginnerflyer.com 
How to Guide/ 
Product Review 
build, subsystem 
instructions and info   
oscarliang.com  Expert Advice building/ components  X 
dronethusiast.com Expert Advice tips, news, reviews   
thedronegirl.com Expert Advice tips, news, reviews   
*Top Source Indicates multiple design inputs or topics were used from source. 
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Appendix C. SUAS Reference CONOPS SENG Design Sequence  
Rev 1: 13 Jan 2015 
Section I - Issue 
A.  Problem Statement 
In the past decade, the US Military and Department of Homeland Security have seen the 
numerous benefits, and have come to rely upon, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and their role 
in combat and information operations.  Fixed wing platforms such as the Predator (MQ-
1)/Reaper (MQ-9) and the Global Hawk (RQ-4) have tremendous capabilities but they are low-
density/high-demand (LDHD) assets; making their availability limited to all but the most critical 
missions. As a result, there has been rapid growth in the area of smaller, unit controlled, RPAs, 
referred to herein as small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).  These are small (less than 20 lbs 
sized air vehicles capable of being operated by small forward deployed units or individuals.  
These vehicles provide critical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data before, 
during, and after ground operations.  Current shortcomings of existing small UAS include 
unreliable imaging, high operator workload, and an inability to track and provide geo-
coordinates for a target vehicle. 
 
B.  Overarching Vision 
To deliver timely and relevant ISR to forward deployed ground based units via the use of a small 
UAS.  Non-cooperatively track a target vehicle using a hand-launched, single operator UAS. 
 
C.  Purpose of the CONOPS 
This document describes operational employment scenarios whereby military personnel could 
realize the benefits offered by a small, easily deployed and operated, UAS.  A common 
command, control, and communications interface will be utilized, enhancing the system 
flexibility and making the system adaptable to a wide variety of situations and environments. 
The system will have a versatile payload configuration allowing for multiple ISR configurations. 
 
 
D. Scope 
This document is intended to be an Enabling Concept and is written at the tactical-level.  
Specifically, the Small UAS CONOPS will describe the anticipated utilization and supporting 
context required to provide tactical ISR to include vehicle tracking.  The system must allow for 
deployment and operation from a single forward based operator in a denied access environment. 
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Section II – Overview 
A. Synopsis 
A Small UAS will provide forward deployed ground based units the capability to conduct low 
altitude, ISR and vehicle tracking operations from a safe standoff distance with minimal 
logistical support. Specifically, the use of the UAS will allow operators to: 
 Rapidly setup and deploy Small UAS from austere location 
 Covertly loiter over a desired target area, providing uninterrupted, or near-
continuous video coverage over a target for a 10 minute interval 
 Continuously track a moving vehicle 
 Utilize payloads optimized for low altitude operations capable of providing 
sufficient resolution for target identification 
 Monitor ISR data from safe standoff distance 
 Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the 
location around the operator 
 Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations 
 
B. Sequenced Actions (Phases) 
Ground Control Setup & Teardown Phase: This phase encompasses all actions necessary to 
deploy the UAS including: unpacking, inventory, assembly, function checks, and mission 
planning.  
Launch Phase: This phase encompasses all actions necessary to achieve initial stable flight 
starting from a properly configured air vehicle and ground control system.  A single operator 
should be capable of launching the system.  Launch phase ends once stable flight is achieved 
and the system begins navigation towards the target location.  
Ingress/Egress Phase: This phase involves transit to/from the target area.   The target area can 
be expected to be a minimum 0.5 miles to 1.0 mile from home base/ launch area. 
Acquisition Phase: The UAS will autonomously detect and acquire a vehicle target.  Upon 
acquisition, the UAS will commence with the surveillance phase. 
Surveillance Phase: Surveillance of the target will be maintained for a minimum of a 10 
minute time span.  Surveillance data will be of sufficient resolution for an operator to 
perform identification of a target vehicle from the supplied video feed. While identification 
of the target vehicle may be confirmed by the operator, initial 
detection/acquisition/reacquisition of the target vehicle will be performed autonomously by 
the UAS.  Continuous, or near-continuous, coverage of a target for a 5 minute interval is 
required.  We define continuous as 100% of a 5 minute interval the target is in the field of 
view.  Near-continuous is defined as greater than 85%.  It should be expected that the target 
vehicle will be moving for at least a portion of the surveillance phase. 
Recovery Phase: This phase involves recovering the air vehicle upon completion of the 
mission or as deemed necessary.  A single operator should be capable of navigating the air 
vehicle to the recovery location, safely landing the vehicle, and retrieving the vehicle for re-
use.   
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Overall Mission:  The solution should have a minimum mission duration of 45 minutes.  This 
shall be verified using a combination of flight test data and analysis of current draw and 
battery capacity. 
External Environment: The UAS will generally operate in an austere and hostile environment 
under a myriad of environmental conditions.  The operational environment will be assumed 
to have global positioning system (GPS) signal as it will be the primary navigation aid for the 
RPA. Operational employment may be dependent upon terrain obstacles and/or operational 
altitude as the primary human-to-vehicle communication pathway will be a high-frequency 
radio signal. Line-of-sight limitations will have to be accounted for in mission planning.  
 
C. Description of Military Challenge 
 
 Forward based operators would like to provide continuous, or near-continuous coverage 
of a target area for a 5 minute period.   
 Forward based operators would like to be able to acquire and track a moving target 
vehicle for an XX minute period. 
 Forward based operators would like a simplified interface and low workload for the 
above tasks so they can maintain situational awareness and security around their 
immediate location.  
 
Section III – Context 
A. Time Horizon 
 
This CONOPS focuses on an enabling capability intended to provide ground based units with 
ISR data in support of theater directed mission taskings.  This CONOPS provides employment 
recommendations for a proposed UAS. Through expanded operation and utilization, the 
recommendations provided are intended to evolve into strategic employment scenarios as best 
practices are collected and documented.  The planned initial utilization begins in FY14 and is 
expected to be used for 2-3 years in the future. 
 
B. Assumptions 
This CONOPS assumes that the capability gap identified herein is still present and unresolved.  
Additionally, it is assumed that airspace deconfliction issues will be resolved, if necessary, prior 
to each mission utilizing the small UAS as there is no intent to address that specific issue within 
this document.  
C. Risks 
The following risks were derived from a consortium of stake holders including, former RPA 
operators, systems architects, subject matter experts, system designers, and testers: 
 Loss of RPA due to hostile detection and action 
 Loss of RPA due to broken communications link 
 Loss of RPA due to system malfunction 
 Loss of RPA due to extreme environmental conditions 
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 Hostile detection of operator location 
 Hostile acquisition of signal feeds and/or control of RPA 
 Loss of mission due to unreliability of system components 
 Loss of mission due to system degradation 
 Loss of RPA and/or mission due to lack of logistical resources 
 Loss of RPA and/or mission due to lack of operator knowledge 
 Injury to operator and/or noncombatants from system operation 
 
 
D. System Requirements 
A Small UAS will provide forward deployed ground based units the capability to conduct low 
altitude, ISR and small payload deployment operations from a safe standoff distance with 
minimal logistical support. Specifically, the UAS will allow operators to: 
 Rapidly setup, mission plan, and deploy Small UAS from austere location.  You 
should assume power will not be available at the austere locations. 
- The system shall require one (objective) or two (threshold) operators to 
perform concurrent vehicle setup and mission planning. 
- Vehicle setup for the small UAS system shall take 10 minutes or less to 
complete, measured from the time unpacking begins to the time when the 
system is ready for launch. 
- Mission planning shall take nor more than 10 minutes to perform.  
Mission planning starts when surveillance and drop target coordinates are 
provided to the operator, and concludes when the vehicle is ready for 
launch. 
- Setup shall be performed without the assistance of any power source not 
provided as part of the UAS system 
 Transit to Target 
- The system shall be capable of navigating to a target at a distance of 0.5 
mile (threshold) to 1.0 mile (objective) distance from the deployment 
location. 
 Autonomously acquire a vehicle target, and maintain track while the target is in 
motion. 
- The system shall provide video with sufficient resolution for target 
identification and tracking.  Sufficiency of resolution is defined as 30 
pixels/m2 at the target plane (to identify vehicles).   
 Loiter over a desired target, providing uninterrupted, or near-continuous 
imagery/video of the target for a 10 minute interval. 
- The system shall be capable of providing 10 minutes of continuous 
(objective – target in FOV 100% of time) or near-continuous (threshold – 
target in FOV 85% of time). 
- Continuously display geo-coordinates of the target vehicle to the operator 
throughout the time while the target is being tracked. 
- Accuracy of the target geo-location shall be 150 ft DRMS (or better). 
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- The system shall loiter at an altitude not to exceed 1000 feet above ground 
level. 
- The system shall be capable of flight up to altitudes of 2000 feet above sea 
level. 
 Monitor ISR date from safe standoff distance. 
- The system shall be capable of operating at a distance of 2000’ from the 
operator/ground station, with an objective range of 2 miles from the 
operator/ground station. 
 Conduct Small UAS operations while maintaining situational awareness of the 
location around the operator. 
- Control and operation of the UAS shall require not more than two 
dedicated operators, with an objective of a single operator. 
- The operator(s) shall be able to identify ground targets while 
simultaneously controlling the vehicle. 
 Provide timely ISR data for ongoing/future ground operations. 
- Imagery/video from the UAS will be displayed in real-time to the ground 
operator(s). 
 Recovery Phase 
- A single operator shall be capable of navigating the air vehicle to the 
recovery location, safely landing the vehicle, and retrieving the vehicle for 
re-use.   
- For purposes of flight test purposes, a safety pilot will land the vehicle 
once the rest of the mission has been completed. 
 Mission Duration 
- The solution shall have a minimum mission duration of 45 minutes.  This 
shall be verified using flight a combination of flight test data and analysis 
of current draw and battery capacity. 
 The UAS must be capable of recovering from common operational problems 
- The UAS shall provide to the operator status of fuel and/or battery power 
available. 
- The UAS shall provide an automated “return to launch” if communication 
to the operator station is lost. 
- The UAS shall provide an indication to the operator in the event of GPS 
loss, and shall include a manual recovery mode if within LOS when GPS 
is lost. 
 Other 
- Safe flight must be greater than 100 feet during all phases expect launch 
and recovery. 
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